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Abstract
We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash
equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral
norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness,
convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly
constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditions and characterize classes of
networks that satisfy each of these conditions.
Keywords: network games, variational inequalities, strong monotonicity, uniform P-function, Nash
equilibrium, existence and uniqueness, best response dynamics, sensitivity analysis
1. Introduction
In many social and economic settings, decisions of individuals are affected by the actions of their friends,
colleagues, and peers. Examples include adoption of new products and innovations, opinion formation
and social learning, public good provision, financial exchanges and international trade. Network games have
emerged as a powerful framework to study these settings with particular focus on how the underlying patterns
of interactions, governed by a network, affect the economic outcome.1 For tractability reasons, many of the
works in this area studied games with special structure (e.g., quadratic cost functions, scalar non-negative
strategies) or special properties (e.g., games of strategic complements or substitutes for which the best
response of each agent is increasing or decreasing in the other agents strategies).2 These works relied on
disparate techniques for their analysis which then lead to different focal network properties for existence and
uniqueness of equilibria. For example, papers on network games of strategic complements typically relate
equilibrium properties to the spectral radius of the (weighted) adjacency matrix of the network (see e.g.
Ballester et al. (2006); Jackson and Zenou (2014); Acemoglu et al. (2015)) while papers considering network
games of strategic substitutes highlight the role of the minimum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix (see e.g.
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014); Allouch (2015)). Moreover, there has been relatively little work on network games
that feature neither strategic complements nor substitutes and possibly involve multidimensional strategy
sets (e.g., models where agents decide their effort level on more than one activity, Chen et al. (2018)).
In this paper, we provide a unified framework based on a variational inequality reformulation of the
Nash equilibrium to study equilibrium properties of network games including existence and uniqueness,
convergence of the best response dynamics and comparative statics. Our framework extends the literature
IResearch supported by the SNSF grant numbers P2EZP2 168812, P300P2 177805 and partially supported by ARO MURI
W911NF-12-1-0509.
Email addresses: parisef@mit.edu (Francesca Parise), asuman@mit.edu (Asuman Ozdaglar)
1See for instance Galeotti (2010); Goyal (2012); Nagurney (2013); Jackson and Zenou (2014); Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2015);
Jackson et al. (2016). Durlauf (2004) offers a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on peer effects.
2See Bulow et al. (1985); Milgrom and Roberts (1990); Vives (1990).
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in multiple dimensions. It applies to games of strategic complements, substitutes as well as games with mixed
strategic interactions. It provides a systematic understanding of which spectral properties of the network
(spectral norm, minimum eigenvalue or infinity norm of the adjacency matrix) are relevant in establishing
fundamental properties of the equilibrium. Moreover, it covers network games with multidimensional and
constrained strategy sets.
Our work is built on the key observation that the analysis of network games can be performed in two
steps. In the first step we focus on the operator of the variational inequality associated with the game, which
is typically referred to as the game Jacobian and we derive sufficient conditions on the network and on the
cost functions to guarantee that it possesses either one of three fundamental properties: strong monotonicity
(which is a stronger version than the strict diagonal concavity condition used in Rosen (1965)), uniform block
P-function and uniform P-function.3 Our sufficient conditions are formulated in terms of different network
measures, i.e., spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of the weighted adjacency matrix, as
detailed in Assumptions 2a), 2b) and 2c). We highlight the relations between these conditions and we show
that for symmetric networks, the condition in terms of the minimum eigenvalue is the least restrictive and
hence is satisfied by the largest set of networks, whereas for asymmetric networks conditions in terms of
spectral norm and infinity norm cannot be compared and are satisfied by different sets of networks. While
the conditions that involve spectral norm and minimum eigenvalue have appeared in the study of special
network games, the condition in terms of the infinity norm is new and arises naturally for games played over
asymmetric networks where each agent is only influenced by a relatively small number of neighbors.
In the second step, we combine our sufficient conditions (connecting network properties to properties of
the game Jacobian) with the theory of variational inequalities to derive equilibrium properties. A summary
of our results is presented in Table 1. Specifically, we extend previous literature results on existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium to games with multidimensional constrained strategy sets and mixed
strategic effects, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee convergence of continuous and discrete best
response dynamics and finally we study how parameter variations affect the Nash equilibrium. Our first
result in this context is to guarantee Lipschitz continuity of the Nash equilibrium under the block P-function
property.4 We then build on a sensitivity analysis result for variational inequalities applied to general games
given in Facchinei and Pang (2010); Friesz and Bernstein (2016) to establish conditions under which the
Nash equilibrium is differentiable and we derive an explicit formula for its sensitivity.5
To illustrate our theory we consider three running examples. First, we consider scalar linear quadratic
network games for which the best response is a (truncated) linear function. These games have been exten-
sively studied in the literature as illustrated in the seminal papers Ballester et al. (2006), where a model
featuring local complements and global substitutes is considered (mainly motivated by crime applications)
and Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), where games with mixed strategic effects are considered. The results in
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) are derived by using the approach of potential games, first introduced in Monderer
and Shapley (1996). Expanding on Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), we show that for scalar linear quadratic games
the existence of a potential function is related to a condition on the symmetry of the network. When such
condition is violated the potential approach suggested in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) cannot be applied. The
variational inequality approach presented in this work can be seen as an extension of the potential approach
for cases when a potential function is not available. In fact, potential games whose potential function is
strongly convex are a subclass of strongly monotone games. By leveraging on the theory of variational in-
equalities (instead of convex optimization) we show how the results in Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoulle´
et al. (2014) can be recovered and extended to linear quadratic models that are not potential.
3 While sufficient conditions for the former two properties in terms of the gradient of the game Jacobian have been studied
in the literature (positive definiteness and the PΥ condition discussed in Scutari et al. (2014), respectively), we here suggest a
novel sufficient condition for the uniform P-function property (which we term uniform P-matrix condition). Our result extends
the P-matrix condition used in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.9(a)) and is needed to guarantee existence and
uniqueness of the solution of a variational inequality without imposing boundedness assumptions on its closed convex set.
4This result extends (Dafermos, 1988, Theorem 2.1) which holds under the more restrictive strong monotonicity condition.
5 Contrary to previous works, our formula for the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium depends on primal variables only.
The only result of such type that we are aware of is (Dafermos, 1988, Theorem 3.1). The formula therein is however obtained
following geometric arguments and consequently depends on the orthogonal projection operator on the set of active constraints.
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Assumption 2a Assumption 2b Assumption 2c
Ki(x) = K˜(x)  0 n = 1,Ki(x) > ν > 0
( Thm. B.1) (Thm. B.2) (Thm. B.3) (Thm. B.4)
Existence and 3 3 3 3
uniqueness (Prop. 2a) (Prop. 2b) (Prop. 2a) (Prop. 2c)
BR dynamics 3 3 3 3
(continuous) (Thm. 2) (Thm. 2) (see assumptions of Thm. 1) (see assumptions of Thm. 3)
BR dynamics 3 3 7 7
(discrete, simult.) (Thm. 2) (Thm. 2) (Ex. E.1A) (Ex. E.1A )
Lipschitz 3 3 3 3
continuity (Thm. 4) (Thm. 4) (Thm. 4) (Thm. 4)
Table 1: Summary of the relation between the considered network and cost conditions (i.e. Assumption 2a, 2b, 2c) and
properties of the Nash equilibrium of the game.
A main feature of linear quadratic games, that significantly simplifies their analysis, is the fact that
the best response function is linear. A few works in the literature have extended the analysis of network
games with scalar strategies to nonlinear settings by focusing on cases where the best response function is
nonlinear but monotone. For example, Belhaj et al. (2014) considers a case where the best response function
is increasing leading to a supermodular game. On the other hand, Allouch (2015) focuses on a model of
public good games where the best response function is decreasing. Conditions for existence and uniqueness
in both these cases have been derived using techniques tailored to the special structure of the problem.
As second motivating example, we consider network games with scalar non-negative strategies where the
best response is nonlinear and non-monotone, representing e.g. races and tournaments where agents work
hardest when network externalities are small (neck and neck race) while they reduce their efforts if they fall
behind (discouragement effect).
Finally, all the games mentioned above feature scalar strategies. As third motivating example, we consider
a network game where each agent decides on how much effort to exert in more than one activity at the time.
This model of multiple activities over networks was first suggested in Chen et al. (2018) and can be used
to study agents engagement in activities that are interdependent such as crime and drug use (if activities
are complements) or crime and education (if activities are substitutes). Chen et al. (2018) focuses on the
particular case when the network effects within the same activity are complements and derives results on
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium by using a similar approach as in the single activity case
studied in Ballester et al. (2006). Our framework enables the study of cases where network effects within
the same activity can be substitutes and interdependencies are present not only in the cost function but
also in the strategy sets (e.g. because of budget constraints).
In addition to the papers cited above, our paper is most related to the seminal works of Harker and Pang
(1990); Facchinei and Pang (2003, 2010); Scutari et al. (2014); Friesz and Bernstein (2016) and references
therein. These works discuss the use of variational inequalities to analyze equilibria of general games. Our
novel contribution is to focus on network games and unfold the effect of network properties on the game
Jacobian and consequently on the equilibrium properties.
The only papers that we are aware of that study properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games
by using variational inequalities are Ui (2016), Melo (2018) and Naghizadeh and Liu (2017a). All these
works consider network games with scalar non-negative strategies. Specifically, Ui (2016) considers Bayesian
network games with linear quadratic cost functions. Melo (2018) considers existence, uniqueness and com-
parative statics for scalar network games with symmetric unweighted networks, by focusing on strong mono-
tonicity of the game Jacobian. For games with strategic substitutes, we show via a counterexample that
strong monotonicity cannot be guaranteed under the minimum eigenvalue condition, not even for scalar
network games with symmetric networks (see Example B.4). In fact our analysis suggests that for scalar
games of strategic substitutes, the natural property is the uniform P-matrix condition. In addition to this
substantial difference, our paper is distinct from Melo (2018) in the following ways: i) we do not consider
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only strong monotonicity but also uniform (block) P-functions, ii) we investigate how properties of the game
Jacobian relate to network properties considering not only the minimum eigenvalue but also the spectral
and infinity norm, iii) we consider networks that might be asymmetric and agents with possibly multidi-
mensional strategy sets, iv) we consider games with mixed strategic effects for which the best response
might not be monotone as a function of the neighbor aggregate, v) besides uniqueness and comparative
statics, we also study convergence of best response dynamics. The recent paper Naghizadeh and Liu (2017a)
focuses on a special case of scalar network games and derives conditions in terms of the absolute value of
the elements of the adjacency matrix for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. This may be overly restrictive
since taking the absolute value loses structural properties associated with games of strategic substitutes.
Naghizadeh and Liu (2017b) studies public good network games by using linear complementarity problems
(which are a subclass of variational inequalities). We remark that variational inequalities have been used to
study specific network economic models such as spatial price equilibrium models, traffic networks, migration
models and market equilibria, as reviewed for example in Nagurney (2013); Facchinei and Pang (2003). In
these settings however the network typically appears as part of the constraints and not in the cost function.
Consequently, the network effects studied in this paper do not appear. Finally, Xu and Zhou (2017) uses
variational inequality theory to study contest games whose cost function does not possess the aggregative
structure considered in this paper (i.e. the cost depends on the strategies of the other agents individually
and not on their aggregate).
It is also worth highlighting that network games have similarities with aggregative games. Equilibrium
properties in aggregative games have been extensively studied in Novshek (1985); Kukushkin (1994); Jensen
(2005); Acemoglu and Jensen (2013); Jensen (2010); Kukushkin (2004); Cornes and Hartley (2012); Dubey
et al. (2006). Moreover, motivated by technological applications such as demand-response energy markets or
communication networks, several papers have studied distributed dynamics for convergence to the equilibria
in aggregative games (see Chen et al. (2014); Koshal et al. (2012, 2016); Grammatico et al. (2016); Paccagnan
et al. (2016)). The main difference is that while in aggregative games each agent is affected by the same
aggregate of the other agents strategies, in network games this aggregate is agent and network dependent.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the framework of network games and three
motivational examples. In Section 3 we recall the connection between variational inequalities and game
theory, we summarize properties that guarantee existence and uniqueness of the solution to a variational
inequality and we present our technical results on the uniform P-matrix condition. Section 4 presents an
overview of our results relating network and cost conditions to properties of the game Jacobian and illus-
trates these conditions for several networks of interest. Sections 5, 6 and 7 exploit the results of Section 4
to study existence and uniqueness, convergence of best response dynamics and comparative statics, respec-
tively. Section 8 concludes the paper. Some basic matrix properties and lemmas used in the main text
are summarized in Appendix A. Appendix B provides the technical statements of the results anticipated in
Section 4 and Appendix C their proofs. Appendix D proves our technical result on the uniform P-matrix
condition. Appendices E and F expand on Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Definitions, examples and technical
statements provided in the appendices are labeled with the corresponding letter.
Notation:
We denote the gradient of a function f(x) : Rn → Rd by ∇xf(x) ∈ Rd×n. Given a, b ∈ N, N[a, b] denotes
the set of integer numbers in the interval [a, b]. In denotes the n-dimensional identity matrix, 1n the vector of
unit entries and ei the ith canonical vector. Given A ∈ Rn×n, A  0 ( 0)⇔ x>Ax > 0 (≥ 0), ∀x 6= 0, A(k,:)
denotes the kth row of A, ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of A and Λ(A) the spectrum. A⊗B denotes the
Kronecker product and [A;B] := [A>, B>]>. Given N matrices {Ai}Ni=1, blkd(A1, . . . , AN ) = blkd[Ai]Ni=1 is
the block diagonal matrix whose ith block is Ai. Given N vectors xi ∈ Rn, x := [x1; . . . ;xN ] := [xi]Ni=1 :=
[x1
>
, . . . , xN
>
]> ∈ RNn. Note that xi is the ith block component of x. We instead denote by [x]h, for
h ∈ N[1, Nn], the h-th scalar element of x. The symbols ≥e and ≤e denote element-wise ordering relations
for vectors. ∂X is the boundary of the set X . ΠQX (x) denotes the projection of the vector x in the closed
and convex set X according to the weighted norm ‖ · ‖Q; ΠX (x) := ΠIX (x). For the definition of vector and
matrix norms see Appendix A.
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2. Network games
Consider a network game G with N players interacting over a weighted directed graph described by the
non-negative adjacency matrix G. The element Gij represents the influence of agent j’s strategy on the
cost function of agent i. We assume Gii = 0 for all i ∈ N[1, N ]. We say that j is an in-neighbor of i if
Gij > 0. We denote by N i the set of in-neighbors of agent i. From here on we refer to in-neighbors simply as
neighbors since we do not consider out-neighbors and we use the terms network and graph interchangeably.
Each player i ∈ N[1, N ] aims at selecting a vector strategy xi ∈ Rn in its feasible set X i ⊆ Rn to minimize
a cost function
J i(xi, zi(x)) (1)
which depends on its own strategy xi and on the aggregate of the neighbors strategies, zi(x), obtained as
the weighted linear combination
zi(x) :=
N∑
j=1
Gijx
j ,
where x := [xi]Ni=1 ∈ RNn is a vector whose i-th block component is equal to the strategy of agent i. The
best response of agent i to the neighbor aggregate zi(x) is defined as
Bi(zi(x)) := arg min
xi∈X i
J i(xi, zi(x)),
where we recall that zi(x) does not depend on xi since Gii = 0. A set of strategies in which no agent has an
incentive for unilateral deviations (i.e., each agent is playing a best response to other agents strategies) is a
Nash equilibrium, that is, {x?i}Ni=1, with x?i ∈ X i for all i, is a Nash equilibrium if for all players i ∈ N[1, N ]
it holds x?i ∈ Bi(zi(x?)).
Network games can be used to model a vast range of economic settings. Nonetheless, for tractability
of analysis and for generating crisp insights the literature adopted specific structural assumptions on best
response functions. The next three examples illustrate such assumptions and show how our framework can
unify previous literature results and enable consideration of richer economic interactions.
Example 1. (Scalar linear quadratic games) Consider a network game where each agent chooses a
scalar non-negative strategy xi ∈ X i = R≥0 (representing for instance how much effort he exerts on a
specific activity) to minimize the linear quadratic cost function
J i(xi, zi(x)) =
1
2
(xi)2 + [Kizi(x)− ai]xi, (2)
with Ki, ai ∈ R. Network games with payoffs of this form have been widely used in the literature to study
various economic settings including private provision of public goods (e.g., innovation, R&D, health invest-
ments in particular vaccinations; see Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007); Bramoulle´ et al. (2014)) and games
with local payoff complementarities but global substitutability (e.g., Ballester et al. (2006) suggests that the
cost of engaging in a criminal activity is lower when friends participate in such behavior, yet may be higher
when overall crime levels increase). For these games, the best response of agent i is given by a (truncated)
linear function of the neighbor aggregate zi(x):
Bi(zi(x)) := max{0, ai −Kizi(x)]}. (3)
From Eq. (3) it is evident that the payoff parameter Ki captures how much the neighbor aggregate zi(x)
affects the equilibrium strategy of agent i. When the Ki are the same for all i, we say that the game has
homogeneous weights. We remark that even in this case, the neighbor aggregate zi(x) may be heterogeneous
across agents. We also note that if for each agent i Ki ≥ 0 (Ki ≤ 0), this is a game of strategic substitutes
(complements), meaning that each agent’s best response decreases (increases) in other agents actions.
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Linear quadratic network games have been studied in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) using the theory of potential
games. This approach entails constructing a proxy maximization problem whose stationary points provide
the set of Nash equilibria. By Monderer and Shapley (1996) a necessary condition for the existence of an
exact potential function is
∂2J i(xi, zi(x))
∂xixj
=
∂2Jj(xj , zj(x))
∂xjxi
. (4)
For linear quadratic network games, this amounts to the restriction that
∂2J i(xi, zi(x))
∂xixj
= KiGij = K
jGji =
∂2Jj(xj , zj(x))
∂xjxi
. (5)
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) focuses on symmetric networks G = G> and (with the exception of the last section)6
on homogeneous weights. In this case condition (5) is met, enabling the use of the potential approach. Our
subsequent analysis studies asymmetric networks and heterogeneous weights.7
The linear quadratic model described above has been extensively studied in the literature, partially due
to the fact that the linearity of its best response function allows for a simple yet informative analysis. As the
second main example, we describe a variation of the previous model, that features a nonlinear best response.
Example 2. (Races and tournaments) Consider a network game where each player has a scalar strat-
egy xi ∈ [ai, bi] and a nonlinear best response (as a function of the neighbor aggregate, denoted by zi for
simplicity)
Bi(zi) = min{ai + φi(zi), bi}. (6)
We assume 0 < ai < bi, φi(0) = 0 and φi(z
i) ≥ 0. Special cases of this model have been considered in
the literature for example in Belhaj et al. (2014) with the additional assumption φ′i ≥ 0 (so that the best
response is increasing in other agents actions, leading to a game of strategic complements) or in Allouch
(2015) with φ′i ≤ 0 (so that the best response is decreasing in other agents actions, leading to a game of
strategic substitutes).8 We do not impose any monotonicity assumption on φi and focus on cases where the
sign of φ′i may change (either for different values of z
i or across different agents).
To illustrate the richer class of strategic interactions that can be modeled by using non-monotone best
response functions, we consider the special case where ai = a, bi = b and φi(z
i) has the form
φi(z
i) = φ(zi) = γzi(b− zi) for all i, (7)
with γ > 0. For simplicity, we additionally assume that the network G is such that
∑
j Gij = 1 (so that the
neighbor aggregate zi(x) is given by a convex combination of the neighbor strategies). The corresponding best
response function is illustrated in Figure 1 and can be used to model races and tournaments. In the initial
phase, when zi ≤ b2 , the players increasing effort motivates a neck and neck race which is then followed by
a second phase, when zi ≥ b2 , where agent’s effort level declines capturing a discouragement effect.
In Examples 1 and 2 agents have a single decision variable. Our last motivating example features agents
that engage in multiple activities, as studied in Chen et al. (2018).
6 Section 6 in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) shows that for heterogeneous weights, there exists a linear change of variables such
that the game in the new coordinates is potential. More in general, for linear quadratic games this happens if there exists a
vector β ∈ RN>0 such that K
i
βi
Gij =
Kj
βj
Gji, which is a generalization of (4). See Lemma A.5 for more details.
7 Instead, we do not explicitly consider cases where the externalities may have different signs for the same agent but different
neighbors. This case, corresponds to a matrix G with both positive and negative entries. Most of our results hold also in this
case, but we find that this additional generality obfuscates the overall presentation.
8 More in detail, therein the author focuses on a public good game for which ai = 0, bi =∞ and φi(zi) = γi(wi + zi)− zi
where γi is consumer’i Engel curve and wi is agent’s i income.
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Figure 1: The best response function given in (6) for φi as in (7) plotted for a = 1, b = 5 and different values of γ.
Example 3. (Multiple activities in networks) Consider a network game where each player i has a
strategy vector xi = [xiA, x
i
B ] ∈ R2 with xiA, xiB representing his level of engagement in two interdependent
activities A and B, such as crime and education. We assume that each player i has lower and upper
constraints for its engagement in each activity (xiA, x¯
i
A, x
i
B , x¯
i
B) and an overall lower and upper budget
constraint (xitot, x¯
i
tot) so that
X i := {xi = [xiA, xiB ] ∈ R2 | xiA ≤ xiA ≤ x¯iA, xiB ≤ xiB ≤ x¯iB , xitot ≤ xiA + xiB ≤ x¯itot}.
This generalizes Chen et al. (2018), where no constraints are considered, and Belhaj and Dero¨ıan (2014)
where a strict budget constraint is imposed (i.e., xitot = x¯
i
tot = 1) so that effectively the strategy of each
agent is a scalar (since xiB = 1 − xiA). Each agent selects its level of engagement in activities A and B to
maximize the following quantity
aiAx
i
A −
1
2
(xiA)
2 + δxiAz
i
A(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net proceeds from activity A
+ aiBx
i
B −
1
2
(xiB)
2 + δxiBz
i
B(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net proceeds from activity B
+µxiAz
i
B(x) + µx
i
Bz
i
A(x)− βixiAxiB︸ ︷︷ ︸
interdependence of activities
,
where the parameter δ weights the effect of the neighbor aggregate within each activity, µ weights the effect
of the neighbor aggregate across different activities and βi captures the interdependence of the two activities
for each agent i. Chen et al. (2018) assumes δ > 0 so that the effort of each agent and its neighbors are
strategic complements within each activity, while βi ∈ (−1, 1) can be negative (modeling two complementary
activities such as crime and drug use) or positive (modeling two substitutable activities such as crime and
education).9 In our analysis, we will also consider the case δ < 0.
3. Connection between game theory and variational inequalities
The main goal of this paper is to provide a unified framework to study existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium, convergence of the best response dynamics and continuity of the Nash equilibrium with
respect to parametric variations for general network games. Throughout the paper we use the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. The set X i ⊆ Rn is nonempty, closed and convex for all i ∈ N[1, N ]. The function
J i(xi, zi(x)) is continuously differentiable and convex in xi for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and for all xj ∈ X j, j ∈ N i.
Moreover, J i(xi, zi) is twice differentiable in [xi; zi] and ∇xiJ i(xi, zi) is Lipschitz in [xi; zi].
9 For the model to be consistent from an economic perspective, the sign of µ should be consistent with the signs of δ and
βi in the sense that sign(µ) = −sign(δ)sign(βi). To see this, consider the case δ < 0 and βi > 0. In this case an increase of
ziA leads to a decrease in x
i
A (since δ < 0) which leads to an increase in x
i
B (since β
i > 0). Overall, ziA and x
i
B are therefore
complements implying that µ must be positive.
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Our approach relies on the theory of variational inequalities as defined next.
Definition 1 (Variational Inequality (VI)). A vector x¯ ∈ Rd solves the variational inequality VI(X , F )
with set X ⊆ Rd and operator F : X → Rd if and only if
F (x¯)>(x− x¯) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ X . (8)
In the following we consider the VI with set
X := X 1 × . . .×XN ⊆ RNn (9)
obtained as the cartesian product of the local strategy sets X i and operator F : X → RNn whose i-th block
component F i(x) is the gradient of the cost function of agent i with respect to its own strategy, i.e.,
F (x) := [F i(x)]Ni=1 := [∇xiJ i(xi, zi(x))>]Ni=1. (10)
This operator is sometimes referred to as the game Jacobian. The relevance of this VI in characterizing
Nash equilibria of general games (i.e., not necessarily network games) comes from the following well-known
relation, see e.g. (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 1.4.2).
Proposition 1 (VI reformulation). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A vector of strategies x? is a Nash
equilibrium for the game G if and only if it solves the VI(X , F ) with X as in (9) and F as in (10).
Proposition 1 can be seen as a generalization of potential games as introduced in Monderer and Shapley
(1996). In fact, it follows from (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 4.4) that a game is potential with
potential function U(x) if and only if ∇xU(x) = F (x). In other words, a game has an exact potential if
and only if the game Jacobian F (x) is integrable. In such case, by the minimum principle, the VI condition
given in (8) coincides with the necessary optimality conditions for the optimization problem minx∈X U(x),
whose stationary points are the Nash equilibria of the game, see e.g. (Bramoulle´ et al., 2014, Lemma 1).
The VI approach enables the analysis of games that are not potential (i.e. games for which F (x) is not
integrable). Specifically, Proposition 1 allows one to analyze the Nash equilibria in terms of properties of
the game Jacobian F and of the set X . To this end, we recall the following definitions.
Definition 2. An operator F : X ⊆ RNn → RNn is
a) Strongly monotone: if there exists α > 0 such that (F (x)−F (y))>(x−y) ≥ α‖x−y‖22 for all x, y ∈ X .
b) A uniform block P-function with respect to the partition X = X 1 × . . . × XN : if there exists η > 0
such that maxi∈N[1,N ][F i(x)− F i(y)]>[xi − yi] ≥ η‖x− y‖22 for all x, y ∈ X .
c) A uniform P-function: if there exists η > 0 such that maxh∈N[1,Nn][F (x)−F (y)]h[x− y]h ≥ η‖x− y‖22
for all x, y ∈ X .
The properties in the previous definition are stated in decreasing order of strength, as illustrated in the first
line of Figure 2.10 We note that in the case of potential games strong monotonicity of F (x) is equivalent to
strong convexity of the potential function U(x). For general games (i.e., not necessarily potential games),
such condition is a slightly stronger version of the diagonal strict concavity condition used in the seminal
work of Rosen (1965) (see more details in Appendix A). The reason why we focus on strong monotonicity
in this work is that it allows us to prove existence of the Nash equilibrium without assuming compactness,
as instead assumed in Rosen (1965). Our interest in the properties listed in Definition 2 stems from the
10 In the literature a block P-function is typically referred to as a P-function with respect to the partition X = X 1× . . .×XN ;
we added the term “block” to avoid any confusion. We note that for n = 1 (i.e., for scalar games) the definitions of uniform
block P-function and uniform P-function coincide.
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following classical result for existence and uniqueness of the solution of a VI, see e.g. (Facchinei and Pang,
2003, Theorem 2.3.3(b) and Proposition 3.5.10(b)).11
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness for VIs). Consider the VI(X , F ) where F is continuous and
X is nonempty, closed and convex. The VI(X , F ) admits a unique solution under any of the following state-
ments:
a) F is strongly monotone.
b) The set X is a cartesian product X 1 × . . .× XN and F is a uniform block P-function with respect to
the same partition.
c) The set X is a rectangle and F is a uniform P-function.
Note that the stronger the condition on F is, the weaker the requirement on the set X is. Proposition 2
together with Proposition 1 allows one to derive sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in terms of properties of the game Jacobian and of the constraint sets. Our main contribution
in Section 4 is to derive sufficient conditions that guarantee that the game Jacobian of a network game has
one of the properties listed in Definition 2, by imposing conditions on the cost functions of the players and
on the spectral properties of the network. To this end, we exploit sufficient conditions for the properties in
Definition 2 to hold in terms of the gradient ∇xF (x) as detailed in the next subsection.
3.1. Sufficient conditions in terms of ∇xF (x)
We start by introducing the definitions of P-matrices, PΥ condition and uniform P-matrix condition.
Definition 3 (P-matrix). (Fiedler and Ptak, 1962, Theorem 3.3) A matrix A ∈ Rd×d is a P-matrix if all
its principal minors have positive determinant. Equivalently, A is a P-matrix if and only if for any w ∈ Rd,
w 6= 0 there exists a diagonal matrix Hw  0 such that w>HwAw > 0.
A special class of P-matrices are positive definite matrices. In fact, if a matrix A is positive definite then
Definition 3 holds with Hw = I. The opposite holds true if the matrix A is symmetric.
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The sufficient conditions detailed in the following Proposition 3 amount to ensuring that ∇xF (x), which
is a matrix valued function, possesses suitable properties “uniformly” in x. For example, strong monotonicity
of F (x) can be guaranteed if the gradient ∇xF (x) is uniformly positive definite. Similarly, to guarantee
that F (x) is a uniform P-function we show that it is sufficient to assume that ∇xF (x) satisfies what we
term a “uniform P-matrix condition” which is given in full generality in Definition D.1 in the appendix. We
here report the corresponding definition for the affine case F (x) = Ax + a. Intuitively, this corresponds to
assuming that ∇xF (x) is a “uniform” P-matrix for all values of x.
Definition 4 (Uniform P-matrix condition - affine case). Consider an operator F (x) = Ax+a where
A ∈ Rd×d, a ∈ Rd. Then ∇xF (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition if and only if there exists η > 0
such that for any w ∈ Rd there exists a diagonal matrix Hw  0 such that w>HwAw ≥ η‖w‖2 and
maxw λmax(Hw) <∞.
The condition above is formulated in terms of the full matrix ∇xF (x) which, in the case of agents with
multidimensional strategies, has dimension Nn × Nn. The PΥ condition introduced next is instead used
to summarize the effect that each pair of agents has on one another with a scalar number. In fact the
condition in Definition 5 relates the properties of a matrix A(x) ∈ RNn×Nn with N blocks each of dimension
11Statement c) is a consequence of statement b). In fact if X is a rectangle then it can be partitioned as X = X 1× . . .×XNn
with Xh ⊆ R for all h ∈ N[1, Nn] and if F is a uniform P-function then it is a uniform block P-function with respect to a block
partition with blocks of dimension one. We here write this condition separately to avoid any confusion with the block partition
X = X 1 × . . .×XN induced by the N players.
12 It is shown in (Fiedler and Ptak, 1962, Theorem 3.3) that if A is a P -matrix then all its real eigenvalues are positive. If
A is symmetric all its eigenvalues are real. These two properties imply that A is positive definite.
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n with the properties of a smaller matrix Υ ∈ RN×N , where the effect of each block is summarized with
a scalar number κi,j (independent of x). Specifically, let Ai,j(x) ∈ Rn×n be the block in position (i, j).
Suppose that for all i ∈ N[1, N ], Ai,i(x) = Ai,i(x)>  0 and let κi,i = infx∈X λmin(Ai,i(x)). Moreover, set
κi,j = supx∈X ‖Ai,j(x)‖2 for j 6= i. Then Υ ∈ RN×N is constructed as follows.
A(x) =

A1,1(x) A1,2(x) . . . A1,N (x)
A2,1(x) A2,2(x) . . . A2,N (x)
...
...
. . .
...
AN,1(x) AN,2(x) . . . AN,N (x)
 → Υ =

κ1,1 −κ1,2 . . . −κ1,N
−κ2,1 κ2,2 . . . −κ2,N
...
...
. . .
...
−κN,1 −κN,2 . . . κN,N
 (11)
Definition 5 (PΥ condition). Scutari et al. (2014) A matrix valued function x 7→ A(x) ∈ RNn×Nn sat-
isfies the PΥ condition over X if Ai,i(x) = Ai,i(x)>  0, κi,j <∞ for all i, j and Υ in (11) is a P-matrix.
The following proposition relates the previous conditions to the properties in Definition 2.
Proposition 3 (Sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity and (block) P-functions). If the op-
erator F is continuously differentiable and the set X is nonempty, closed and convex, the following holds.
a) F is strongly monotone if and only if there exists α > 0 such that ∇xF (x)+∇xF (x)
>
2  αI.
b) If ∇xF (x) satisfies the PΥ condition (as by Definition 5), then F is a uniform block P-function.
c) If ∇xF (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition (as by Definition D.1 in Appendix D), then F is
a uniform P-function.
Statements a) and b) can be found in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 2.3.2(c)) and (Scutari et al.,
2014, Proposition 5(e)). The proof of statement c) is given in Appendix D. The conditions in Proposition 3
are illustrated in the second line of Figure 2.
F is strongly monotone ⇒ F is a uniform block P-function ⇒ F is a uniform P-function
m ⇑ ⇑
∃α > 0 s.t. ∇xF (x) satisfies the ∇xF (x) satisfies the uniform
∇xF (x)+∇xF (x)>
2  αI PΥ condition as by Def. 5 P-matrix condition as by Def. D.1
Figure 2: Relation between properties of F and sufficient conditions in terms of ∇xF (x), see Proposition 3.
It is important to stress that while both strong monotonicity and the PΥ condition are sufficient to
guarantee that F is a uniform block P-function (and hence uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium), there is
in general no relation between the two. In fact there are strongly monotone functions whose gradient does
not satisfy the PΥ condition (see Example B.3) and there are functions whose gradient satisfies the PΥ
condition but are not strongly monotone (see Example B.1). Besides existence and uniqueness, we show
in Section 6 that the PΥ condition guarantees convergence of the best response dynamics, while we show
in Section 7 that strong monotonicity is useful for sensitivity analysis. Finally, we employ the uniform
P-function condition for the analysis of scalar games of strategic substitutes. Consequently, it is important
to understand conditions under which each of the properties in Figure 2 is satisfied.
4. Properties of the game Jacobian in network games
Our goal in this section is to find sufficient conditions in terms of the influence of agent i on its marginal
cost (i.e., ∇2xixiJ i(xi, zi)), the influence of the neighbor aggregate on the cost of agent i (i.e., ∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi))
and the network G to guarantee that the game Jacobian F (x) posses the properties detailed in Definition 2.
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To this end, we exploit the sufficient conditions on ∇xF (x) detailed in Proposition 3. In the case of network
games, ∇xF (x) can be rewritten as
∇xF (x) = D(x) +K(x)W, (12)
where W := G⊗ In and
D(x) := blkd[Di(x)]Ni=1 := blkd[∇2xixiJ i(xi, zi) |zi=zi(x)]Ni=1
K(x) := blkd[Ki(x)]Ni=1 := blkd[∇2xiziJ i(xi, zi) |zi=zi(x)]Ni=1.
(13)
Note that by the properties of the Hessian, Di(x) = Di(x)>, hence D(x) = D(x)>. Let us define
κi1 := min
x
λmin(D
i(x)), κ1 := min
i
κi1,
κi2 := max
x
‖Ki(x)‖2, κ2 := max
i
κi2.
(14)
With this notation it is clear that for network games the quantities in Definition 5 can be rewritten as
κi,i = κ
i
1 and κi,j = κ
i
2Gij . The next example provides some intuition.
Example 1 (Continued). Consider Example 1 with ai = 0 for simplicity. According to Proposition 1 a
vector x? is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it solves the VI(X , F ) where X = R≥0 × . . .×R≥0 = RN≥0 and
F (x) = [∇xiJ i(xi, zi(x))]Ni=1 = [xi +Kizi(x)]Ni=1 = [xi +Ki
∑N
j=1Gijx
j ]Ni=1 = [IN +KG]x,
with K := blkd[Ki]Ni=1. From ∇xF (x) = IN +KG we obtain Di(x) = 1 and Ki(x) = Ki for all i ∈ N[1, N ].
Consequently, the quantities in (14) are κi1 = κ1 = 1 for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and κi2 = |Ki|, κ2 = maxi |Ki|.
To get an intuition on the role of the quantities introduced in (14) in our subsequent analysis, let us
consider the strongly monotone case. By Proposition 3a, to prove strong monotonicity of F one needs to
show that ∇xF (x)+∇xF (x)
>
2 is positive definite for all x. By using the gradient structure highlighted in (12)
it is immediate to see that for network games
∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)>
2
= D(x) +
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
 λmin(D(x))I + K(x)W +W
>K(x)>
2
. (15)
Consequently, the positive definiteness of ∇xF (x)+∇xF (x)
>
2 can be guaranteed by bounding the minimum
eigenvalue of the sum of the two matrices on the right hand side of (15). It is clear that such a bound should
depend on κ1 = minx λmin(D(x)), κ2 = maxx ‖K(x)‖2 as defined in (14) and on the properties of G, since
W = G⊗ In. This approach motivates us to study conditions of the form
αw := κ1 − κ2w(G) > 0 (16)
where w(G) is a scalar that captures the network effect. Condition (16) can be understood as a bound on
how large can the effect of the neighbor aggregate (measured by κ2) be on an agent payoff with respect to
the effect of its own action (measured by κ1) where w(G) is a weight that scales the magnitude of the two
effects. In the following, we consider three different network measures, as detailed next.
Assumption 2 (Sufficient conditions in terms of κ1, κ2 and G). Suppose that at least one of the fol-
lowing conditions holds:
α2 := κ1 − κ2‖G‖2 > 0, (Assumption 2a)
α∞ := κ1 − κ2‖G‖∞ > 0, (Assumption 2b)
αmin := κ1 − κ2|λmin(G)| > 0. (Assumption 2c)
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Assumption 2a and 2c allows us to recover and extend conditions derived in the literature for special
instances of network games by using a different type of analysis. Assumption 2b is new to our knowledge
and provides a natural summary of the network effect since ‖G‖∞ corresponds to the maximum row sum of
G and is thus a measure of the maximum aggregate influence that the neighbors have on each agent.
Our main technical result in this paper is to show that each of the three conditions in Assumption 2
guarantees a different set of properties of the game Jacobian, as summarized in Table 2.
Assumption 2a Assumption 2b Assumption 2c
Ki(x) = K˜(x)  0 ∀i n = 1,Ki(x) ≥ ν > 0 ∀i
Strong mon. 3 7 3 7
(Thm. B.1) (Ex. B.1) (Thm. B.3) (Ex. B.4 )
PΥ condition 3 3 7 7
(Thm. B.1) (Thm. B.2) (Ex. B.3) (Ex. B.4 )
Unif. P-function 3 3 3 3
(Fig. 2) (Fig. 2) (Fig. 2) (Thm. B.4)
Table 2: Summary of the relation between Assumptions 2a, 2b, 2c and properties of the game Jacobian. The technical
statements are provided in Appendix B. In all cases we suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For negative cases we provide a
counter-example in Appendix B. We list the PΥ condition instead of the block P-function property because we show in Section 6
that the former is required for convergence of the discrete best response dynamics. Note that Assumptions 2c alone does not
guarantee any property, in fact multiple Nash equilibria may arise (see Ex. B.2).
Before providing some intuitions on the results of Table 2, we outline the relation between the conditions
in Assumption 2 and delineate which classes of networks satisfy each one of them.
4.1. Some comments on Assumption 2
Table 2 shows that Assumption 2a guarantees both strong monotonicity and the PΥ condition. However,
depending on the network, this assumption might be restrictive. To see this, note that the larger the value of
‖G‖2 is, the more restrictive Assumption 2a becomes. Figure 3 shows that for some representative networks
such as the complete network (Figure 3a) or the asymmetric star (Figure 3d), ‖G‖2 might actually grow
unbounded in the number of players N . This means that, for such networks, Assumption 2a may not hold
as the number of agents grows. We argue in the next subsections that Assumption 2b and 2c may be used
as alternative conditions in these cases by showing that for symmetric networks Assumption 2c holds for a
broader range of networks, while for asymmetric networks Assumption 2a and 2b allow addressing different
set of networks.
Symmetric networks Asymmetric networks
a) b) c) d)
(2a): ‖G‖2 N − 1 = 3 2 2.2882
√
N − 1 ≈ 1.7
(2b): ‖G‖∞ N − 1 = 3 2 2 1
(2c): |λmin(G)| 1 2 - -
Figure 3: Spectral properties of some representative networks with N = 4. a) Complete network: ‖G‖2 = ‖G‖∞ = N − 1,
|λmin(G)| = 1; b) Bipartite network; c) 2-regular network; d) Asymmetric star: ‖G‖2 =
√
N − 1, ‖G‖∞ = 1. We use the
convention that Gij corresponds to an arrow from j to i, since Gij > 0 means that agent i is affected by the strategy of agent
j. For example in the network d), all the agents are affected by the strategy of the agent in the top left corner and he is not
affected by any other agent. In all the networks above, we use unitary edge weight.
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4.1.1. Relation between ‖G‖2 and ‖G‖∞
Since Gii = 0 it follows from Gershgorin theorem that ρ(G) ≤ ‖G‖∞. If G is symmetric, ‖G‖2 =
ρ(G) (see Lemma A.3 in the Appendix). Consequently, we get ‖G‖2 = ρ(G) ≤ ‖G‖∞. This shows that
whenever G is symmetric Assumption 2b is more restrictive than Assumption 2a. Hence Assumption 2b is
a viable alternative to Assumption 2a only for asymmetric networks. For asymmetric networks, there is no
relation between ‖G‖2 and ‖G‖∞, i.e., there are networks for which ‖G‖2 < ‖G‖∞ and networks for which
‖G‖∞ < ‖G‖2. Figures 3c) and 3d) show some examples of the latter case, thus justifying our interest for
Assumption 2b. Note for example that for the asymmetric star network, we have ‖G‖2 =
√
N − 1 while
‖G‖∞ = 1 independently of N , thus Assumption 2b can hold for large number of players while Assumption 2a
does not. More generally, we note that, for the case of regular networks where each agent has the same
number d of in-neighbors, one gets immediately that ‖G‖∞ = d. Lemma A.4 in Appendix A shows that
ρ(G) = d. Since for asymmetric matrices ρ(G) ≤ ‖G‖2 we obtain ‖G‖∞ = d = ρ(G) ≤ ‖G‖2. Hence for
asymmetric regular networks Assumption 2b is a relaxation of Assumption 2a. Figure 3c) shows an example
where the inequality is strict.
Figure 4: Summary of the relations between Assumptions 2a, 2b and 2c, for asymmetric and symmetric networks.
4.1.2. Relation between ‖G‖2 and |λmin(G)|
If the network is symmetric, then all the eigenvalues of G are real and λmin(G) is well defined. In this
case, we have already mentioned that ‖G‖2 ≤ ‖G‖∞. The relation between ‖G‖2 and λmin(G) is detailed
in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that G = G> is a non-zero and non-negative matrix entry-wise with zero diagonal.
Then λmin(G) < 0 and λmax(G) = ρ(G) = ‖G‖2. Consequently, |λmin(G)| ≤ ‖G‖2.
Proof. Since G is non-negative, it follows from Perron-Frobenius theorem that λmax(G) = ρ(G) > 0. Since
Tr(G) =
∑
i λi(G) = 0 and λmax(G) > 0, it must be λmin(G) < 0.
In other words, Lemma 1 proves that if G is symmetric Assumption 2c is less restrictive than Assump-
tion 2a. Figure 3 shows networks where this is strictly the case. Note for example that for the complete
network in Figure 3a) we have ‖G‖2 = N − 1 while λmin(G) = −1 independently of N , thus Assumption 2c
can hold for large number of players while Assumption 2a does not. We stress that there are graphs of
interest for which |λmin(G)| = ‖G‖2. Some examples are the undirected ring with an even number of nodes
or any bipartite graph (see Figure 3b). For these cases, Assumption 2c and Assumption 2a coincide. For
general d-regular graphs, it is known that |λmin(G)| = ‖G‖2 if and only if G is bipartite. The gap between
|λmin(G)| and ‖G‖2 when G is not bipartite is studied e.g. in Desai and Rao (1994). Figure 4 shows a
summary of the relations between the three assumptions for asymmetric and symmetric networks.
4.2. Some intuitions on the results in Table 2
The technical statements relative to the results in Table 2 and their proofs are provided in Appendices B
and C. We here provide an overview and some intuition on these results.
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4.2.1. Strong monotonicity
According to Proposition 3a, F (x) is strongly monotone if and only if ∇xF (x) is uniformly positive
definite. We have already mentioned at the beginning of this section - see Eq. (15) - that such a condition
can be guaranteed by lower bounding the smallest eigenvalue of the Jordan product K(x)W+W
>K(x)>
2 .
In Theorem B.1a) we show that for any matrix K(x) and W it holds
λmin
(
K(x)W+W>K(x)>
2
)
≥ −‖K(x)‖2‖G‖2 = −κ2‖G‖2. (17)
This immediately implies that strong monotonicity holds under Assumption 2a.
We show in Example B.1 that instead Assumption 2b does not guarantee strong monotonicity. A loose
intuition can be provided by noting that when n = 1 by Gershgorin theorem,
λmin
(
K(x)G+G>K(x)
2
)
≥ − 12‖K(x)G+G>K(x)‖∞ ≥ −κ22 (‖G‖∞ + ‖G‖1).
When G is asymmetric, Assumption 2b provides a bound on ‖G‖∞ but it does not impose any assumption
on ‖G‖1. When G is symmetric, we recall that Assumption 2a is less strict than Assumption 2b.
Finally, Assumption 2c can be used to guarantee strong monotonicity if additionally G = G> and
Ki(x) = K˜(x)  0 for all agents i. In this case, we show in Theorem B.3 that the lower bound in (17) can
be further improved to
λmin
(
K(x)W+W>K(x)>
2
)
≥ −‖K˜(x)‖2|λmin(G)| = −κ2|λmin(G)|.
To illustrate this case, consider the scalar linear quadratic game in Example 1, so that K(x) = K ∈ RN×N .
If the weights Ki are homogeneous and positive, then K(x) is a scalar positive matrix, that is, K(x) = κ2IN .
Using this fact and the symmetry of the network it is immediate to see that
λmin
(
KG+G>K
2
)
= λmin
(
κ2G+κ2G
>
2
)
= λmin (κ2G) = −κ2|λmin(G)|.
The two assumptions that the game features strategic substitutes (i.e. Ki > 0) and the weights Ki are
homogeneous (i.e. Ki = κ2 ∀i) are critical in this argument. In the case of complements one would instead
get K(x) = −κ2IN and the negative sign would imply λmin (−κ2G) = −κ2λmax(G) = −κ2‖G‖2 leading
back to the more restrictive Assumption 2a. Instead, when the weights are heterogeneous, K is a positive
diagonal matrix with different diagonal elements and it might happen that
λmin
(
KG+G>K
2
)
< −κ2|λmin(G)|,
as illustrated in Example B.4. If this happens, Assumption 2c is not sufficient to guarantee strong monotonic-
ity, even in the case of scalar games of strategic substitutes. We show instead that in this case Assumption 2c
guarantees that the game Jacobian satisfies the weaker uniform P-function property.
4.2.2. PΥ condition
The main advantage of the PΥ condition is that it is expressed on the reduced matrix Υ, which has size
N ×N , instead of the gradient ∇xF (x), which has size Nn×Nn. This dimension reduction is achieved by
summarizing the matrix of cross agents interactions with a single scalar number
∂2Ji(x)
∂xi∂xj = K
i(x)Gij → κi,j = maxx ‖Ki(x)‖2Gij , ∀i 6= j.
This operation loses the sign properties of Ki(x). Consequently, any distinction between game of strategic
complements or substitutes is lost in the Υ matrix. To clarify this, consider again the linear quadratic game
in Example 1 with Ki = −δ for all i (recall that this is a game of strategic complements if δ > 0 and
substitutes if δ < 0). In both cases Υ = I − |δ|G. This is the fundamental reason why Assumption 2c,
which is typical of games of strategic substitutes, cannot be used to ensure the PΥ condition. The fact that
instead Assumption 2a and 2b are both sufficient is proven in Theorems B.1 and B.2 by showing that,
under these assumptions, the matrix M := κ1I − κ2G is a P-matrix. The conclusion then follows from the
fact that Υ is a Z-matrix and is element-wise greater than M .
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4.2.3. Uniform P-function
The previous two subsections highlight that under Assumption 2a and 2b, the game Jacobian is either
strongly monotone or it satisfies the PΥ condition (which are stronger properties than the uniform P-function
property discussed here). Assumption 2c is instead sufficient to prove strong monotonicity if the network
weights Ki(x) are homogeneous and positive definite. With heterogeneous weights, we focus on the special
class of scalar games of strategic substitutes (i.e. n = 1, Ki(x) ≥ ν > 0). In this case, even though the game
Jacobian might not be strongly monotone (see Example B.4), we show in Theorem B.4 that it is a uniform
P-function. Understanding whether any of the properties in Definition 2 holds under Assumption 2c when
n > 1 and the weights are heterogeneous is an open problem.
5. Existence and uniqueness
This section uses the properties established in Table 2, together with Propositions 1 and 2, to present
existence and uniqueness results for the Nash equilibrium of special classes of network games. We organize
our discussion by first focusing on linear quadratic (multidimensional) network games, whereby we also
explain how our theory recovers and extends existing results, and then we discuss the less explored class of
nonlinear network games.
5.1. Linear quadratic network games
We start by considering linear quadratic games with general convex closed strategy sets X i ⊆ Rn and
cost function
J i(xi, zi(x)) :=
1
2
(xi)>Qixi + (Kizi(x) + ai)>xi, (18)
where Qi,Ki ∈ Rn×n, Qi = (Qi)>  0 and ai ∈ Rn. Note that for such games Di(x) = Qi,Ki(x) = Ki.
Consequently, D(x) = blkd[Qi]Ni=1 and K(x) = blkd[K
i]Ni=1 are both independent of x. The results of
Table 2 immediately yield the following two corollaries; the first one for general linear quadratic games
(using Theorem B.1 and B.2) and the second for linear quadratic games of strategic substitutes (using
Theorems B.3 and B.4).
Corollary 1 (Linear quadratic games). Consider a linear quadratic game with cost functions as in (18).
Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds:
min
i
[
λmin(Q
i)
]−max
i
[‖Ki‖2] ‖G‖2 > 0, (LQ2)
min
i
[
λmin(Q
i)
]−max
i
[‖Ki‖2] ‖G‖∞ > 0. (LQ∞)
Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Condition (LQ2) guarantees that Assumption 2a is met. By Theorem B.1 the game Jacobian is
strongly monotone and the statement follows from Propositions 1 and 2a). Condition (LQ∞) guarantees
that Assumption 2b is met. By Theorem B.2 the game Jacobian satisfies the PΥ condition and the statement
follows from Propositions 1 and 2b).
We note that Condition (LQ2) guarantees that the sufficient condition derived in Ui (2016) holds.
13 The
second corollary focuses on G = G> and provides alternative sufficient conditions in terms of |λmin(G)| for
games of strategic substitutes (recall that for symmetric networks it holds |λmin(G)| ≤ ‖G‖2 ≤ ‖G‖∞).
13 For general games, Proposition 1 in Ui (2016) states that if F (x) is strictly monotone then there exists at most one Nash
equilibrium. For linear quadratic network games Proposition 4 therein states that if Q + KG  0 then there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium. Using this condition Ui (2016) shows that one can recover the results in Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoulle´
et al. (2014), among others. We note that Condition (LQ2) in this work is a sufficient condition for Q+KG  0. On the other
hand, Condition (LQ∞) does not imply Q+KG  0 and thus allows the study of linear quadratic network games that do not
satisfy the condition in Ui (2016).
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Corollary 2 (Linear quadratic games of strategic substitutes). Consider a linear quadratic game with
cost functions as in (18). Suppose that G = G> and that one of the following conditions holds:
1. Scalar games of strategic substitutes: n = 1, Ki > 0 ∀i.
2. Homogeneous weights: Ki = K˜ ∀i, K˜ + K˜>  0.
Then the condition
min
i
[
λmin(Q
i)
]−max
i
[‖Ki‖2] |λmin(G)| > 0 (LQmin)
guarantees existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Condition (LQmin) guarantees that Assumption 2c holds. Under condition 1), X is rectangular
since n = 1 and Theorem B.4 guarantees that F is a uniform P-function (note that ν := miniK
i > 0).
Under condition 2), Theorem B.3 guarantees that F is strongly monotone. In both cases existence and
uniqueness then follow by Propositions 1 and 2.
To place our results in the context of the existing literature, we revise the network game with multiple
activities described in Example 3, which subsumes the models studied in Ballester et al. (2006); Bramoulle´
and Kranton (2007); Bramoulle´ et al. (2014); Chen et al. (2018) and introduces new features such as budget
constraints that have not been considered before.
Example 3 (Continued). Consider the network game described in Example 3 and note that the payoff of
each agent corresponds to a cost function as in (18) with
Qi :=
[
1 βi
βi 1
]
, Ki := −
[
δ µ
µ δ
]
, ai := −
[
aiA
aiB
]
.
Consequently, λmin(Q
i) = 1 − |βi| > 0 and ‖Ki‖2 = |δ| + |µ|. Corollary 1 provides the following sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
min
i
(1− |βi|)− (|δ|+ |µ|)‖G‖2 > 0 (19)
min
i
(1− |βi|)− (|δ|+ |µ|)‖G‖∞ > 0 (20)
Condition (19) reduces to Assumptions 1 and 4 in Chen et al. (2018) for the sub-cases considered therein
where X i = R2, G is symmetric, δ ≥ 0, µ = 0. For the case δ ≥ 0 but µ 6= 0, Assumption 3 in Chen et al.
(2018) is equivalent to (19) if the signs of µ and βi follow the relation detailed in Footnote 9. We also note
that both Conditions (19) and (20) do not require δ to be positive, apply to possibly asymmetric networks
and can be used for any closed and convex set X i (e.g., representing budget constraints).
For the case when δ is negative and G is symmetric a more expansive condition can be obtained by using
Corollary 2-2. In fact, in this model
Ki := −
[
δ µ
µ δ
]
=
[ −δ −µ
−µ −δ
]
=: K˜.
If δ < 0 the elements on the diagonal of K˜ are positive and if |µ| < |δ| then det(K˜) = δ2 − µ2 > 0 implying
that K˜  0. From Corollary 2-2 a sufficient condition for uniqueness is thus
G = G>, δ < 0, |µ| < |δ|, min
i
(1− |βi|)− (|δ|+ |µ|)|λmin(G)| > 0, (21)
which can be seen as a generalization of the results in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) to network games with multiple
activities where network effects within the same activity are substitutes.
To better illustrate the relation between our conditions and the ones derived in previous works we consider
the case βi = β for all agents i, µ = 0, G = G> and no budget constraint so that X i = R2≥0. If β = 0 then
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Complements Substitutes
(δ > 0) (δ < 0)
Single activity ‖G‖2 < 1δ |λmin(G)| < 1|δ|
(β = 0) Ballester et al. (2006) Bramoulle´ et al. (2014)
Multiple activities ‖G‖2 < 1−|β|δ |λmin(G)| < 1−|β||δ|
(β 6= 0) Chen et al. (2018)
Table 3: Sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for different linear quadratic games, seen as special cases
of Example 3 for µ = 0, βi = β, G = G> and X i = R2≥0.
there is no coupling between the activities and hence the equilibria of this model are the same as the equilibria
of the single activity model described in Example 1. Table 3 shows that conditions (19) and (21) recover to
the well-known conditions in Ballester et al. (2006), Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2018) for the
cases studied therein. A novel condition is obtained for games that feature strategic substitutability within
the same activity.
Condition (20) is new. To illustrate its utility, recall from the analysis in Section 4.1.1 that this condition
may handle cases not covered by Condition (19) when the network is asymmetric. An example that illustrates
this additional flexibility is a game with single activity (β = 0) and strategic complements (δ > 0) where
there is an agent which is a trend setter in the sense that its decision influences the rest of the agents much
more than any other agent, as in the network illustrated in Figure 5. For this network ‖G‖2 = 1.7437
⇒ G =

0 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 0 0.1 0.1
1 0.1 0 0.1
1 0.1 0.1 0

Figure 5: Black arrows have higher weight than gray arrows, implying that the agent in the top left corner is a “trend setter”.
while ‖G‖∞ = 1.2. Hence by using the condition of Ballester et al. (2006) one can guarantee uniqueness
for δ < 0.5735 while by using the new Condition (20), uniqueness is guaranteed for the larger interval
δ < 0.8333.
5.2. Nonlinear network games
We next consider network games with nonlinear cost functions of the form
J i(xi, zi(x)) := qi(xi) + f i(zi(x))>xi, (22)
where f i, qi are differentiable functions and {qi}Ni=1 are uniformly strongly convex with constant κ1 > 0.
Note that for games with this structure κ2 = maxi maxzi ‖∇zif i(zi)‖. We use the results in Table 2 to
obtain the following corollaries for this class of games.
Corollary 3 (Nonlinear network games). Consider a nonlinear network game with cost functions as in
(22). Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds
κ1 − κ2‖G‖2 > 0, (NL2)
κ1 − κ2‖G‖∞ > 0. (NL∞)
Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Under (NL2) Assumption 2a is met. The result follows from Theorem B.1 and Propositions 1 and
2a). Under (NL∞) Assumption 2b is met. The result follows from Theorem B.2 and Propositions 1 and 2b).
Corollary 3 under (NL∞) generalizes the result in Acemoglu et al. (2015) (obtained for the case n = 1,
qi(xi) = 12 (x
i)2, f i = f for all i, where f is a contraction mapping, and the network G is such that∑
j 6=iGij = 1) to games with generic heterogeneous interaction functions f
i and multidimensional strategies.
If we consider games of strategic substitutes we instead obtain the following.
Corollary 4 (Nonlinear network games of strategic substitutes). Consider a network game with cost
function as in (22). Suppose that G = G>, n = 1 and that at least one of the following holds
1. there exists ν > 0 such that (f i)′(zi) ≥ ν for all i and all zi;
2. (f i)′(zi) > 0 for all i and all zi and X i is lower bounded for all i.
Then the condition
κ1 − κ2|λmin(G)| > 0 (NLmin)
guarantees existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Under condition 1. the conclusion follows from Theorem B.4 and Propositions 1 and 2c). Under
condition 2. Theorem B.4 guarantees that F (x) is a P-function (see Definition A.1). Since this is a scalar
game of strategic substitutes the best response function of each agent is non-increasing in zi. Let ai be the
lower bound on X i and zia :=
∑
j 6=iGija
j . Then zi(x) ≥ zia for all x ∈ X and Bi(zi(x)) ≤ Bi(zia) =: bi.
Equivalently, the best response takes values in the compact interval [ai, bi]. The conclusion then follows from
the fact that a Nash equilibrium exists by Brower fixed point theorem and there is at most one equilibrium
since F (x) is a P-function, see (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.10 (a)).
Note that Corollary 4 applies only to scalar games. Nonetheless, it slightly extends the result in Allouch
(2015) by allowing for more general interaction functions.14 To illustrate the results in Corollary 3 and 4
we consider Example 2 which nests the models discussed in Belhaj et al. (2014) and Allouch (2015).
Example 2 (Continued). The best response discussed in Example 2 corresponds to a network game where
each agent has cost function J i(xi, zi) = 12 (x
i)2 − (ai + φi(zi))xi and strategy set X i = [ai, bi]. Conse-
quently, κ1 = 1, κ2 = maxi |φ′i(zi)|. By Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 existence and uniqueness can thus
be guaranteed if 1 − maxi |φ′i(zi)|min{‖G‖2, ‖G‖∞} > 0 or, if additionally G = G> and φ′i(zi) < 0, if
1 −maxi |φ′i(zi)||λmin(G)| > 0. Let us consider again the special case with ai = a, bi = b, φi(zi) = φ(zi) =
γzi(b− zi), for all i and network G such that ∑j Gij = 1. Recall that the parameter γ > 0 models the level
of network effects. For this particular choice of φi(z
i) and G, it turns out that κ2 = γmaxz∈[a,b] |b−2z| = γb
and ‖G‖2 ≥ ‖G‖∞ = 1. Hence (NL∞) guarantees uniqueness of the equilibrium for γ < 1b .
To further understand the equilibrium structure we start by considering symmetric equilibria. Suppose
xi = x¯γ for each i. Then it holds z
i =
∑
j Gij x¯γ = x¯γ for each i. Hence x¯(γ) = x¯γ1N is an interior
symmetric equilibrium if and only if φ(x¯γ) = x¯γ − a. The plot on the left of Figure 6 shows that such
equation admits a solution x¯γ ∈ (a, b) for any γ > 0. Hence for any level of network effects there exists a
symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all the agents exert the same effort. From the uniqueness result above
we know that for small levels of network effects (i.e. γ < 1b ), this is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Belhaj et al. (2014) shows that if φ′i > 0 (i.e. the games features strategic complements) and satisfies
some curvature conditions (e.g. φi is concave) then the Nash equilibrium is unique, no matter the level of
14 The setup of Allouch (2015) coincides with the choice qi(xi) = (xi)2 and f i(zi) = −[γi(wi + zi) − zi], where γi is
consumers i’s Engel curve and wi > 0 is his income. The network normality condition therein (i.e., 1 + 1
λmin(G)
< (γi)′(·) < 1)
can be rewritten as − 1
λmin(G)
> (f i)′(·) > 0, which implies that this is a game of strategic substitutes (i.e., (f i)′(·) > 0) and
that Assumption 2c is satisfied (i.e., 1−maxzi |(f i)′(zi)||λmin(G)| > 0).
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network effects. We next show that when the best response is instead non-monotone, for large values of
γ, multiple equilibria may arise. To exemplify this point we consider a case with N = 2 players, G = Gc
and we set a = 1, b = 5. The equilibria of this game are shown in Figure 6 (right). For γ < 0.4866 there
is a unique equilibrium which is symmetric (x1S = x
2
S , black line). This is consistent with our theory that
guarantees a unique equilibrium for γ < 1b = 0.2. The gap between the thresholds γ = 0.4866 and γ = 0.2 is
due to the fact that our condition is sufficient but not necessary. For γ > 0.4866 two additional asymmetric
equilibria arise where agent 1 is highly engaged (x1A blue dashed line) and agent 2 is scarcely engaged (x
2
A
blue dashed-dotted line) or viceversa. Note that for γ ≥ 1a = 1 these two equilibria converge to fully and
minimally engaged, that is (x1A, x
2
A) = (a, b) or viceversa. Overall, we can conclude that when network effects
are small the result of competition is to have two agents that are both equally engaged, if network effects
are high there is instead the possibility of specialization with one agent clearly dominating over the other.
This result is qualitatively similar to Proposition 3 in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), where it was shown that, for
the game of strategic substitutes considered therein, for large network effects there exists at least one Nash
equilibrium with inactive agents.
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Figure 6: Left: φ(z) for different values of γ and z − a. Right: Equilibria of Example 2 with N = 2, G = Gc, a = 1, b = 5.
6. Best response dynamics
After characterizing the set of Nash equilibria, we here discuss how agents can reach such a configuration
by iteratively playing their best responses. In accordance with the previous literature we consider both
continuous and discrete best response dynamics (BR dynamics). For continuous time we consider the
scheme introduced in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) and reported in Algorithm 1.15
Algorithm 1 Continuous best response dynamics
Set: xi(0) = xi0 ∈ X i, zi(0) =
∑N
j=1Gijx
j(0)
Dynamics:
x˙i(t) = Bi(zi(t))− xi(t) =
[
arg min
xi∈X i
J i(xi, zi(t))
]
− xi(t) ∀i ∈ N[1, N ].
For the case of discrete dynamics, we index by k ∈ N the time instants at which at least one agent is
updating its strategy. For each i ∈ N[1, N ], we denote by Ti ⊆ N the subset of time instants at which agent
i updates its strategy. In Algorithm 2 we consider two variants of the discrete BR dynamics depending on
whether the agents update their strategies simultaneously or sequentially, which correspond to Ti = N and
Ti = N(N− 1) + i, respectively.
15 We note that under Assumption 1, it follows by the fact that Ji(xi, zi) is strongly monotone in xi, ∇xiJi(xi, zi) is
Lipschitz continuous in zi and (Dafermos, 1988, Theorem 2.1) that Bi(zi) = arg minxi∈X i Ji(xi, zi) is Lipschitz continuous in
zi. Hence, Bi(zi(x))− xi is Lipschitz continuous in x and Algorithm 1 admits a unique solution x(t) for all initial conditions
and all t ≥ 0 by (Khalil, 1996, Theorem 2.3).
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Algorithm 2 Discrete best response dynamics
Set: k = 0, xi0 ∈ X i, zi0 =
∑N
j=1Gijx
j
0. Set either Ti = N for all i (simultaneous BR dynamics) or
Ti = N(N− 1) + i for all i (sequential BR dynamics).
Iterate:
xik+1 =
{
Bi(zik) = arg minxi∈X i J
i(xi, zik), if k ∈ Ti
xik, otherwise
∀i ∈ N[1, N ].
This type of dynamics have been used in the literature to refine the set of Nash equilibria by focusing on
those that are asymptotically stable for the continuous/discrete BR dynamics.16 Intuitively, this means that
following a small change of the strategies the agents can converge back to equilibrium by simply following
their continuous/discrete BR dynamics.
It is well known that if the game has a strongly convex potential then the continuous BR dynamics (as
well as the sequential discrete BR dynamics) globally converge to the unique Nash equilibrium, see Lemma
E.2. The intuition behind this result is simple: since each strategy update leads to a decrease of the potential
function, the BR dynamics must converge to the unique minimum of such potential which is the unique Nash
equilibrium. From (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 4.4) it follows that a game is potential if and only
if there exists U(x) such that ∇xU(x) = F (x). It is then easy to see that such potential U(x) is strongly
convex if and only if F (x) is strongly monotone. In other words, strongly convex potential games are a
subclass of strongly monotone games. This motivates the question of whether the preceding convergence
results can be generalized to strongly monotone games that are not potential.
The answer to this question depends on the type of dynamics considered (continuous vs discrete). For
continuous BR dynamics note that, in a potential game, U(x) acts as a Lyapunov function (Sandholm,
2010, Section 7.1.1). In fact let B(x) be the vector of best responses to the strategy vector x (i.e. [B(x)]i =
Bi(zi(x))) and define d(x) := B(x)− x, then
U˙(x(t)) = ∇xU(x(t))>x˙(t) = F (x(t))>d(x(t))
and it follows by the definition of best response (see Lemma E.1) that for any x ∈ X
F (x)>d(x) ≤ −κ1‖d(x)‖22. (23)
In other words, d(x) is a descent direction for the potential function U(x).
If the game is not potential then F (x) cannot be seen as a gradient of any function. Hence while (23)
still holds, the interpretation of d(x) as a descent direction is lost. In the following theorem we show that,
however, if F (x) is strongly monotone and the cost function has the following form
J i(xi, zi) :=
1
2
‖xi‖2Qi + f i(zi)>xi (24)
for Qi = (Qi)>  0 and f i : Rn → Rn, then a similar argument can be made by using the Lyapunov function
U˜(x) := F (x)>(x−B(x))− 1
2
‖x−B(x)‖2Q (25)
where Q := blkd[Qi]Ni=1. The reason why we consider cost functions as in (24) is that, in this case, the best
response mapping solves a quadratic program in xi and can thus be rewritten as a projection step, that is,
B(x) = ΠQX [x−Q−1F (x)] (26)
16 We refer to an equilibrium x? as asymptotically stable for some given dynamics if there exists an open neighborhood O
of x? such that the dynamics asymptotically converge to x? starting from any point x0 ∈ O and as globally asymptotically
stable if this holds for O = X .
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as shown in Lemma E.3. We note that the cost structure in (24) is general enough to include all our
motivating Examples 1 to 3. Formula (26) allows us to show that d(x) is a descent direction for U˜(x).
Lemma 2. Consider a network game satisfying Assumption 1 and with agent cost functions as in (24).
Suppose that F (x) is strongly monotone with constant α then
∇xU˜(x)>d(x) ≤ −α‖d(x)‖22.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is the convergence of the continuous BR dynamics under strong
monotonicity.
Theorem 1. Consider a network game satisfying Assumption 1 and with agent cost functions as in (24).
Suppose that F is strongly monotone. Then for any x0 ∈ X the sequence {x(t)}t≥0 generated by Algorithm 1
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of G.
It is important to remark that U˜(x) as defined in (25) is a Lyapunov function since U˜(x) decreases along
the continuous trajectory x(t), but it is not a potential for the game as defined in Monderer and Shapley
(1996). For this reason, strong monotonicity is not sufficient to guarantee convergence of the discrete BR
dynamics. To see this, note that, when the cost function is as in (24), the discrete BR dynamics coincide,
by (26), with the projection algorithm
xk+1 = Π
Q
X [xk − τQ−1F (xk)]
for the step choice τ = 1. If F is strongly monotone the projection algorithm converges when τ is small
but not necessarily for τ = 1, see e.g. Facchinei and Pang (2003). A counter-example, illustrating that
strong monotonicity alone (without the potential structure) is not sufficient to guarantee convergence of the
discrete BR dynamics (either simultaneous or sequential) is given in Example E.1.
Interestingly, Example E.1 shows that strong monotonicity is not enough to guarantee convergence of the
discrete simultaneous BR dynamics even when the game is potential. The reason is that while in sequential
BR dynamics one can guarantee that each step decreases the potential, in the case of simultaneous moves
this is no longer true. In (Scutari et al., 2014, Theorem 10) it is shown that convergence of the discrete
simultaneous BR dynamics can instead be guaranteed by using the PΥ property. The reason why this result
holds is fundamentally different from the argument used in potential games. In fact it is not based on the
existence of a Lyapunov function, but convergence is instead guaranteed by showing that the best response
mapping is a block-contraction, as recalled in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. (Scutari et al., 2014, Proposition 42) Consider a game for which ∇xF (x) satisfies the PΥ
condition, then the best response mapping B(x) is a block-contraction, that is, there exist c ∈ RN>0 and
0 < δc < 1 such that
max
i
‖Bi(x)−Bi(y)‖2
ci
≤ δc max
i
‖xi − yi‖2
ci
for all x, y ∈ X .
The PΥ condition can be used to prove convergence of any of the algorithms above, as detailed next.
Theorem 2. Consider a network game satisfying Assumption 1 and suppose that ∇xF (x) satisfies the PΥ
condition. Then for any x0 ∈ X the sequence {x(t)}t≥0 generated by Algorithm 1 and the sequence {xk}∞k=0
generated by Algorithm 2 converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of G.
We note that convergence of the discrete BR dynamics follows immediately from (Scutari et al., 2014,
Theorem 10) where convergence is proven for general games (i.e. not necessarily network games) and for
both simultaneous and sequential updates (in fact, also random updates with delays can be considered, see
Algorithm 1 therein). The result on convergence of the continuous BR dynamics under the PΥ condition is
instead new.
It is important to stress that the block contraction property used in Theorem 2 to prove convergence of
the discrete BR dyanmics does not necessarily hold under strong monotonicity (see Example E.2). A number
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of alternative discrete time algorithms have been suggested in the literature to guarantee convergence to
the Nash equilibrium when the game Jacobian is strongly monotone. These schemes typically depend on
some tuning parameters and are meant for applications where there is flexibility in tuning the algorithm or
the update of the agents. For this reason, we do not discuss these algorithms here and we instead refer the
interested reader to Chen et al. (2014); Koshal et al. (2012, 2016) where the use of distributed projection
algorithms is discussed, to Scutari et al. (2014) where a regularized version of the best response dynamics
is presented and to Parise et al. (2015a,b) where convergence of the best response dynamics for strongly
monotone linear quadratic network games is achieved by assuming that the agents respond to a filtered
version of the neighbor aggregate. Note that Theorems B.1 and B.3 in this work give sufficient conditions
in terms of the network to guarantee strong monotonicity and thus convergence of such schemes.
A summary of the results discussed so far in this section is provided in the following table.
Potential game Strongly monotone PΥ condition
Continuous BR dynamics 3 3 3
Algorithm 1 (Sandholm (2010)) ( if cost as in (24) - Thm. 1) (Thm. 2)
Discrete sequential 3 7 3
Alg. 2 with Ti = N(N− 1) + i (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) (Ex. E.1B) (Scutari et al. (2014) - see Thm. 2)
Discrete simultaneous 7 7 3
Alg. 2 with Ti = N (Ex. E.1A) (Ex. E.1B) (Scutari et al. (2014) - see Thm. 2)
Table 4: Summary of the relation between properties of F and convergence of the BR dynamics.
By combining Table 4 with the results in Table 2 one immediately gets that if either Assumption 2a)
or Assumption 2b) hold then the PΥ condition is met (by Theorems B.1 and B.2) and both Algorithms
1 and 2 converge by Theorem 2. For games of strategic substitutes with symmetric networks, one can
consider also Assumption 2c). Theorems 1 and B.3 guarantee that, if the cost function is as in (24) and
Ki(x) = K˜(x)  0 ∀i, then the continuous BR dynamics (Algorithm 1) converge but Example E.1A) shows
that the discrete BR dynamics (Algorithm 2) may not. The only case of Table 2 which is not covered by
the previous theory is the case when n = 1 and Ki(x) > 0. In this case F is a P-function hence none of
the previous conditions apply. We next show that nonetheless it is possible to prove convergence of the
continuous BR dynamics. Example E.1A) instead shows that the discrete BR dynamics might not converge.
Theorem 3. Consider a scalar network game satisfying Assumption 1 and with cost function as in (24) with
Qi = 1 for all i ∈ N[1, N ]. Assume that G = G> and that ∇xF (x?) is a P-matrix. Moreover, suppose that
the equilibrium is non degenerate, that is, if x?,i ∈ ∂X i then F i(x?) 6= 0.17 Then x? is locally asymptotically
stable for the continuous BR dynamics given in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3 generalizes (Allouch, 2015, Theorem 2). A summary of the results on BR dynamics for
network games under Assumption 2a), 2b) and 2c) is given in Table 1 in the introduction. To illustrate our
findings we apply the previous theory to the multiple activities model considered in Example 3.
Example 3 (Continued). We divide our analysis in two cases.
If either condition (19) or (20) hold, then ∇xF (x) satisfies the PΥ condition and Theorem 2 allows us
to conclude that the unique Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable for both Algorithm 1 and 2
(i.e. both continuous and discrete BR dynamics globally converge). Recall that this model includes as special
cases the games studied in Chen et al. (2018) (for δ > 0) and Ballester et al. (2006) (for β = 0). Our result
proves convergence of the continuous and discrete BR dynamics in both these models.
17 Note that the assumption Qi = 1 is without loss of generality because in the scalar case Qi is a positive number, hence
one can always consider an equivalent game with cost functions J˜i(x) =
Ji(x)
Qi
. The assumption that ∇xF (x?) is a P-matrix
is weaker than the assumption that F satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition and is guaranteed under the assumptions of
Theorem B.4. Finally, the assumption that the equilibrium is non degenerate corresponds to the assumption that the strict
complementarity condition holds, see Assumption 5c) and Appendix F for a related discussion.
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If δ < 0, then condition (21) guarantees that F (x) is strongly monotone. Theorem 1 allows us to conclude
global convergence of the continuous BR dynamics. This result is in line with the findings of (Bramoulle´
et al., 2014, Corollary 2) obtained for games with scalar strategies.
7. Comparative statics
We finally study how the Nash equilibrium changes when the cost functions of the agents or the network
changes. To this end, we introduce the parametric cost functions
J i(xi, zi(x), yi) (27)
where yi ∈ Yi ⊆ Rdi is a local parameter and we set Y := Y1 × . . .× YN ⊆ Rd to be the set of all possible
parameters. We denote by G(y,G) the game with parameter y ∈ Y and network G. The corresponding
parametric game Jacobian is
F (x, y,G) := [∇xiJ i(xi, zi(x), yi)]Ni=1. (28)
We generalize Assumption 1 as follows.
Assumption 3 (Parametric games). The set X i ⊆ Rn is nonempty closed and convex for all i ∈ N[1, N ].
The function J i(xi, zi(x), yi) is continuously differentiable and strongly convex in xi for all i ∈ N[1, N ], for
all xj ∈ X j, j ∈ N i and for all yi ∈ Yi. Moreover, J i(xi, zi, yi) is continuously differentiable in [xi; zi; yi]
and ∇xiJ i(xi, zi, yi) is differentiable and Lipschitz in [xi; zi; yi]. Let L be the maximum of such Lipschitz
constants over i ∈ N[1, N ].
7.1. Lipschitz continuity
Theorem 4 (Lipschitz continuity). Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and that for a given y¯ ∈ Y and
network G¯, the operator F (x, y¯, G¯) is a uniform block P-function with constant η¯, so that the Nash equilibrium
x?(y¯, G¯) of the game G(y¯, G¯) is unique.18 Then for any y ∈ Y and any Nash equilibrium x?(y, G¯) of the
perturbed game G(y, G¯) it holds
‖x?(y, G¯)− x?(y¯, G¯)‖2 ≤ L
η¯
‖y − y¯‖2.
If additionally X is bounded then for any y ∈ Y, any network G and any Nash equilibrium x?(y,G) of
G(y,G) it holds
‖x?(y,G)− x?(y¯, G¯)‖22 ≤
L2
η¯2
(‖G− G¯‖22∆2 + ‖y − y¯‖22),
where ∆ := maxx∈X ‖x‖2.
A similar Lipschitz continuity result for the solution of general VIs was presented in (Dafermos, 1988,
Theorem 2.1) under the assumption of strong monotonicity. Melo (2018) studies Lipschitz continuity of the
Nash equilibrium in strongly monotone network games. With respect to both of these works, Theorem 4
proves Lipschitz continuity under the weaker uniform block P-function property allowing the analysis of
games whose Jacobian is not strongly monotone, e.g. under Assumption 2b) or 2c).
The assumptions needed in Theorem 4 to obtain Lipschitz continuity of the Nash equilibrium are fairly
general. In the next section we study its differentiability by considering more structured constraint sets and
adopting a constraint qualification assumption.
18See the sufficient conditions for the uniform block P-function property derived in Theorems B.1 to B.4.
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7.2. Differentiability
In this section we consider a fixed network and hence omit G in G(y,G), F (x, y,G) and x?(y,G). We
also assume that the sets X i are polyhedra and satisfy the Slater constraint qualification, as presented next.
This allows us to use a KKT reformulation of the VI(X , F ), as recalled in Proposition 4.
Assumption 4 (Polyhedral constraints). The constraint sets can be expressed as X i := {xi ∈ Rn |
Bixi ≤ bi, Hixi = hi}, for some Bi ∈ Rmi×n, bi ∈ Rmi , Hi ∈ Rpi×n, hi ∈ Rpi . There exists xi ∈ X i such
that Bixi < bi.
For simplicity, we define B := blkd(B1, . . . , BN ) ∈ Rm×Nn, b = [bi]Ni=1 ∈ Rm, H := blkd(H1, . . . ,HN ) ∈
Rp×Nn, h = [hi]Ni=1 ∈ Rp, so that X = {x ∈ RNn | Bx ≤ b,Hx = h}.
Proposition 4 (KKT system for VIs). Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. The following statements
are equivalent:
1. x?(y) solves the VI(X , F (·, y));
2. there exists λ(y) ∈ Rm and µ(y) ∈ Rp such that
F (x?(y), y) +B>λ(y) +H>µ(y) = 0 (29a)
Hx?(y) = h, λ(y)>(Bx?(y)− b) = 0, (29b)
Bx?(y) ≤ b, λ(y) ≥ 0. (29c)
The previous proposition is proven in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 1.3.4 and 3.2.1).
Assumption 5 (Constraint qualification). Given a parameter y¯ ∈ Y and the corresponding Nash equi-
librium x?(y¯), let B0, b0 be the matrices obtained by deleting from B, b all the rows corresponding to con-
straints that are not active at x?(y¯) (i.e. the rows k ∈ N[1,m] such that B(k,:)x?(y¯) < bk). Set A := [B0;H]
and a := [b0, h]. Suppose that the following properties hold:
5a) ∇xF (x?(y¯), y¯) +∇xF (x?(y¯), y¯)>  0,
5b) A has full row rank,
5c) the strict complementarity slackness condition λk(y¯) > 0 when B(k,:)x
?(y¯) = bk is satisfied.
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Under Assumptions 3, 4 and 5, the Nash equilibrium is locally unique and differentiable, as shown in
Facchinei and Pang (2010) and Friesz and Bernstein (2016). It is important to note that while Lipschitz
continuity of the Nash equilibrium can be easily obtained in network games (see Theorem 4), to prove
differentiability one needs to rely on Assumption 5a), which is implied by strong monotonicity, and on
Assumptions 5b) and 5c) which, on the other hand, depend on the constraint structure and might be
difficult to verify a priori. In some special cases however they can be easily checked. For example, if there
are only equality constraints both conditions immediately hold. In fact, in the case of equality constraints,
if A is not full row rank then there are redundant constraints that can be removed without loss of generality,
hence 5b) always hold. Condition 5c) on the other hand involves only inequality constraints and is trivially
met if B is the empty matrix.
For the cases when Assumption 5 holds, an explicit formula for the Jacobian of x?(y) at y¯ is given
in (Friesz et al., 1990, Theorem 1). Such formula involves both the primal and dual variables associated
with the solution to VI(X , F (·, y¯)) and is therefore difficult to interpret in terms of simple primitives of
19Under Assumptions 3, 4, 5a and 5b, λ(y¯) is unique, see e.g. Friesz et al. (1990). Assumption 5 is used to apply an implicit
function theorem type of argument to the KKT system, see Friesz and Bernstein (2016). For example, 5a) is a second-order
condition implying that the equilibrium is locally unique.
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the network game.20 By considering only the active constraints instead of the whole KKT system, we
present here an equivalent formula for ∇yx?(y¯) that does not depend explicitly on the dual variables. This
reformulation allows us to have an immediate understanding of the behavior of the Nash equilibrium for
small perturbation of the parameter.
Proposition 5 (Nash equilibrium sensitivity formula). If Assumptions 3, 4 and 5 hold then the Ja-
cobian of x?(y) at y¯ can be expressed as
∇yx?(y¯) = −M [∇yF (x, y)]{x=x?(y¯),y=y¯} (30)
where
M := [L− LA>[ALA>]−1AL],
L := [∇xF (x, y)]−1{x=x?(y¯),y=y¯}
(31)
and A is as defined in Assumption 5.
Proposition 5 is proven in our companion paper Parise and Ozdaglar (2017) where we additionally show
how it can be used to study optimal interventions in networks, along the lines of Ballester et al. (2006);
Acemoglu et al. (2015). We show in Appendix F how Assumption 5 and Proposition 5 simplify in the case
of scalar strategies and non-negativity constraints.
To illustrate our findings we apply the previous theory to the race and tournaments model introduced
in Example 2.
Example 2 (Continued). We already showed that this game has a symmetric equilibrium x¯(γ) = x¯γ1N for
any value of γ and that this is the unique equilibrium when γ < 1b (since Assumption 2b is met). Theorem 2
immediately allows us to conclude that for γ < 1b , the BR dynamics (both continuous and discrete) are globally
converging, hence the unique equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable with respect to both continuous and
discrete BR dynamics.
In the following we aim at studying how the symmetric equilibrium changes if γ changes. To this end,
note that the equilibrium is interior since x¯γ ∈ (a, b). Hence the matrix A, as defined in Assumption 5, is
empty. Assumption 5b) and 5c) are therefore trivially met. We need to verify Assumption 5a). Recall that
F i(x) = xi − (a+ γzi(b− zi)) hence
∂F i(x)
∂xi
= 1 and
∂F i(x)
∂xj
= −γGij(b− 2zi).
Overall,
∇xF (x, γ){x=x¯(γ)} = I − γG and ∇γF (x, γ){x=x¯(γ)} = −x¯γ(b− x¯γ)1N ,
where γ := γ(b− 2x¯γ). Consequently, Assumption 5a) is met if I − γ G+G>2  0. For γ < 1b it holds −1 <−γb = γ(b − 2b) < γ < γb < 1 or equivalently |γ | < 1. Hence a sufficient condition for Assumption 5a)
to be met is that G is not only row stochastic but also column stochastic, in which case ρ
(
G+G>
2
)
= 1.
Formula (30) then leads to
∇γ x¯(γ) = x¯γ(b− x¯γ)[I − γG]−11N = x¯γ(b− x¯γ)
[∑∞
k=0 
k
γG
k
]
1N = x¯γ(b− x¯γ)
[∑∞
k=0 
k
γG
k
1N
]
= x¯γ(b− x¯γ)
[∑∞
k=0 
k
γ1N
]
=
x¯γ(b−x¯γ)
1−γ 1N >e 0,
hence the equilibrium effort is increasing in the network weight γ (note that all the components have the
same derivative consistently with the fact that this is a symmetric equilibrium).
20 The formula for the derivative of the vector w(y) provided therein is∇yw(y¯) = −[∇wΓ(w, y)]−1[∇yΓ(w, y)] |{w=w(y¯),y=y¯},
where Γ(w, y) is the KKT system obtained by considering only the equalities in (29a) and (29b), see (Friesz and Bernstein,
2016, Eq. (7.126)) for more details. The formula for ∇yx?(y¯) obtained from the first block component of ∇yw(y¯) depends on
the dual variables λ(y¯), µ(y¯).
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When γ > 1b we have already shown that multiple equilibria might appear. It is interesting to note
that for large values of γ Assumption 5a) is not satisfied (hence formula (30) cannot be applied) and
∇xF (x, γ){x=x¯(γ)} has a negative eigenvalue. Recalling that x¯(γ) is an interior equilibrium and using for-
mula (26), the continuous BR dynamics can be linearized around the symmetric equilibrium leading to the
error dynamics e˙(t) = −∇xF (x¯(γ), γ)e(t), e(t) := x(t) − x¯(γ) (see also the proof of Theorem 3). For large
γ the matrix ∇xF (x¯(γ), γ) has a negative eigenvalue and, in this range, x¯(γ) is not asymptotically stable
(by Lyapunov’s method).21 This result suggests a bifurcation type of behavior where the symmetric equilib-
rium is asymptotically stable when unique, but is not asymptotically stable for values of γ corresponding to
multiple equilibria. An interesting consequence is that the total effort in the stable equilibrium might not be
monotone in γ. For instance, the following plot shows that the sum of the aggregate effort in the game with
N = 2 agents is increasing in γ in the symmetric equilibrium, but is decreasing in the asymmetric equilib-
rium. It can be shown by the linearization argument above that for this example the symmetric equilibrium
is asymptotically stable until the bifurcation point and after that it is not, while the asymmetric equilibrium
is asymptotically stable whenever it exists. Therefore, the total effort in the asymptotically stable equilibrium
is first increasing and then decreasing. This is in sharp contrast with the results in Belhaj et al. (2014) and
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) that show that the total effort at the maximum equilibrium22 is increasing for games
of strategic complements and decreasing for games of strategic substitutes, respectively.
0 0.5 1.0 1.5
2
4
6
8
10
Network weight (γ)
To
ta
le
qu
ili
br
iu
m
ef
fo
rt
Symmetric
Asymmetric
Figure 7: Total equilibrium effort in the equilibria of Example 2 with N = 2, G = Gc, a = 1, b = 5. The solid line denotes
asymptotically stable equilibria for the continuous BR dynamics.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a systematic characterization of the properties of the Nash equilibrium of
network games. Our analysis encompass games of strategic complements or substitutes or that feature none
of these effects. It applies to games with multidimensional and possibly unbounded strategy sets. Our
approach exploits the equivalent characterization of Nash equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities
and proceeds in two steps. In the first part of the paper (Section 4), we study how the cost function of the
agents and different network properties can be related to properties of the game Jacobian (see summary
in Table 2). In the second part of the paper (Sections 5 to 7), we study how the properties of the game
Jacobian affect existence and uniqueness of equilibria, convergence of discrete and continuous best response
dynamics and comparative statics in network games (see summary in Table 1). Our analysis allows a more
systematic understanding of the relation between assumptions that are typically used in the literature of
network games and provides novel conditions that cover new classes of network games.
21This result is qualitatively consistent with Proposition 5 in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), where it is shown that for the game of
strategic substitutes considered therein and for large network effects all stable equilibria involve at least one inactive agent.
22We note that the symmetric equilibrium of the game in Figure 7 is not a maximum equilibrium because, as shown in
Figure 6, in the asymmetric equilibrium one agent plays an higher strategy. In fact, the three equilibria of this game cannot
be ordered.
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A. Tools from operator theory, variational inequalities, matrix and spectral theory
A.1. Operator properties, existence and uniqueness for VIs and connection with Rosen (1965)
We report in the following definition a slightly weaker version of the properties in Definition 2.
Definition A.1. An operator F : X ⊆ RNn → RNn is
a) Strictly monotone: if (F (x)− F (y))>(x− y) > 0 for all x, y ∈ X , x 6= y.
b) A block P-function with respect to the partition X = X 1×. . .×XN : if maxi∈N[1,N ][F i(x)−F i(y)]>[xi−
yi] > 0 for all x, y ∈ X , x 6= y.
c) A P-function: if maxh∈N[1,Nn][F (x)− F (y)]h[x− y]h > 0 for all x, y ∈ X , x 6= y.
Figure A.8 illustrates the relations between the properties in Definition 2 (used in the main text) and
the weaker properties in Definition A.1.
strongly monotone ⇒ uniform block P-function ⇒ uniform P-function
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
strictly monotone ⇒ block P-function ⇒ P-function
Figure A.8: Relation between properties of F commonly used in the theory of VIs. The underlined properties are the ones
used in the main text.
Consider a VI(X , F ), where X is nonempty, closed and convex and F is continuous. If F satisfies any
of the properties in the first line of Figure A.8 then VI(X , F ) admits a unique solution (for any X , X a
cartesian product and rectangular X , respectively). If F satisfies any of the properties in the second line
of Figure A.8 then VI(X , F ) admits at most a solution (for the same options of X ), see (Facchinei and
Pang, 2003, Theorem 2.3.3, Proposition 3.5.10). Note that in the latter case, existence of a solution is not
guaranteed. Existence can however be guaranteed in general if X is additionally bounded (Facchinei and
Pang, 2003, Corollary 2.2.5).
In Rosen (1965) existence and uniqueness of the (Nash equilibrium seen as) solution of the VI(X , F ) is
shown for X compact and convex under a diagonal strict concavity condition which (for r = 1 as defined
therein) coincides with strict monotonicity. This result is consistent with the known results for existence
and uniqueness of the VI solution summarised above. Note that, in this sense, our sufficient conditions for
strong monotonicity derived in Theorems B.1 and B.3 can be seen as sufficient conditions for the diagonal
strict concavity condition employed in Rosen (1965). By proving strong instead of strict monotonicity we are
however able to prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for sets X that are not necessarily
bounded (e.g., X i = Rn≥0). Finally, the case of uniform block P-functions and uniform P-functions are
not considered in Rosen (1965) and allow for the analysis of network games whose operator is not strictly
monotone (see Theorems B.2 and B.4).
A.2. Auxiliary lemmas and definitions
Definition A.2 (Vector and matrix norms). Given a vector v ∈ Rd and a matrix A ∈ Rd×d the follow-
ing definitions hold
1. ‖v‖2Q = v>Qv for Q = Q>  0 and ‖v‖2 = ‖v‖I
2. ‖A‖2 :=
√
λmax(A>A) (spectral norm)
3. ‖A‖1 := maxj
∑d
i=1 |[A]ij | (max column sum)
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4. ‖A‖∞ := maxi
∑d
j=1 |[A]ij | (max row sum)
Lemma A.1 (Matrix norms). Given a matrix A ∈ Rd×d the following relations between matrix norms
hold
1. ‖A‖2 ≤
√‖A‖1‖A‖∞
2. ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖2
3. 1√
d
‖A‖∞ ≤ ‖A‖2 ≤
√
d‖A‖∞
4. ‖A‖2 = ‖A>‖2
Lemma A.2 (Properties of the Kronecker product). Consider any matrices A,B,C,D of suitable di-
mensions so that the following statements are well-defined. The following properties hold.
1. ‖A⊗B‖2 = ‖A‖2‖B‖2
2. Λ(A⊗B) = Λ(A)Λ(B) := {λAλB | λA ∈ Λ(A), λB ∈ Λ(B)}
3. (A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = (AC ⊗BD)
4. (A⊗B) + (A⊗ C) = (A⊗ (B + C))
5. (A⊗B)> = (A> ⊗B>)
6. α(A⊗B) = (αA⊗B) = (A⊗ αB)
Lemma A.3 (Properties symmetric matrices). Consider a symmetric matrix A ∈ Rd×d, A = A>.
The following statements hold
1. A  λmin(A)Id
2. |λmin(A)| ≤ ρ(A) = ‖A‖2
3. λmin(αI +A) = α+ λmin(A)
Lemma A.4. Consider a non-negative matrix A ∈ RN×N such that A1N = d1N . Then ρ(A) = d.
Proof. This fact is known, we report the proof for completeness. Note that clearly d is an eigenvalue of
A, hence ρ(A) ≥ d. We conclude the proof by showing ρ(A) ≤ d. Let λ be the eigenvalue that achieves the
spectral radius, that is, |λ| = ρ(A) and let v be the corresponding eigenvector. Moreover, let i ∈ N[1, N ]
be the index such that |vi| = maxNj=1 |vj |, note that |vi| > 0. From the ith component of Av = λv we
get |λ||vi| = |λvi| = |
∑N
j=1Aijvj | ≤
∑N
j=1 |Aij ||vj | ≤
∑N
j=1Aij |vi| = d|vi|. Dividing by |vi| > 0, we get
ρ(A) = |λ| ≤ d.
Lemma A.5. Consider the linear quadratic game of Example 1. If there exists {βi > 0}Ni=1 such that for
all i, j ∈ {1, N}
Ki
βi
Gij =
Kj
βj
Gji (A.1)
then the game with rescaled coordinates x˜i =
1√
βi
xi has parameters K˜
i = K
i
βi
, network G˜ij = Gij
√
βiβj and
admits an exact potential.
Proof. By making the change of coordinates xi =
√
βix˜i the cost function can be reformulated as
J i(x˜) = 12 (
√
βix˜i)
2−ai√βix˜i+Ki
∑
j Gij
√
βix˜i
√
βj x˜j = βi
1
2 (x˜i)
2−ai√βix˜i+Ki
∑
j G˜ij x˜ix˜j where G˜ij :=
Gij
√
βi
√
βj . Minimizing J
i(x˜) is equivalent to minimizing J˜ i(x˜) = J
i(x˜)
βi
= 12 (x˜i)
2− ai√
βi
x˜i+ K˜
i
∑
j G˜ij x˜ix˜j
where K˜i := K
i
βi
. This game has an exact potential if and only if K˜iG˜ij = K˜
jG˜ji which is true by assump-
tion.
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Remark A.1. The following special cases of Lemma A.5 are discussed in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014).
1. If G = G> the change of coordinates corresponding to βi = Ki leads to a game that is homogeneous
(K˜i = 1) and has a symmetric network.
2. If there exists {αi > 0}Ni=1 such that αiGij = αjGji for all i, j ∈ {1, N}, the change of coordinates
corresponding to βi =
Ki
αi
leads to a game with K˜i = αi and G˜ij = Gij
√
KiKj√
αiαj
. This is equivalent
to a game with K¯i = 1 and symmetric network G¯ij = αiG˜ij (since G¯ij = αiG˜ij = αiGij
√
KiKj√
αiαj
=
αjGji
√
KiKj√
αiαj
= G¯ji by assumption).
B. Table 2: Technical statements and counter examples
In this section we detail the results of Table 2. To help with the understanding of the following theorems
we consider as benchmark the simple linear quadratic game presented in Example 1. This model belongs
to the class of network games that are typically considered in the literature and allow us to easily compare
our results. Moreover, we show in the next subsections that, despite its simplicity, a vast range of different
strategic interactions can be captured with it by simply tuning the values of the parameters Ki (modeling
the weight of the neighbor aggregate on each agent i).
B.1. A condition in terms of ‖G‖2
As discussed in Section 4 the strongest result is obtained under Assumption 2a, which depends on ‖G‖2.
In this case, both strong monotonicity and the PΥ condition hold.
Theorem B.1 (Strong monotonicity and PΥ condition under Assumption 2a). Suppose that As-
sumptions 1 and 2a hold. Then the game Jacobian F as defined in (10)
1. is strongly monotone with constant α2,
2. satisfies the PΥ condition.
For cases when Assumption 2a is not satisfied (see Section 4), we develop in the following subsections
alternative guarantees in terms of Assumptions 2b and 2c.
B.2. A condition in terms of ‖G‖∞
As detailed in Section 4.1.1, Assumption 2b is useful for asymmetric networks where each agent is
influenced by a relatively small number of agents (i.e., ‖G‖∞ is small). The next theorem shows that this
is sufficient to prove the PΥ condition.
Theorem B.2 (PΥ condition under Assumption 2b). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2b hold. Then
the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) satisfies the PΥ condition.
On the other hand, under Assumption 2b, it is not possible to guarantee strong monotonicity. An
illustrative example is given next.
Example B.1 (Assumption 2b: PΥ but not strongly monotone). Consider the linear quadratic game
in Example 1 with N = 6 players over an asymmetric star as in Figure 3d) and Ki = 0.9 for all i ∈ N[1, 6].
Then
α∞ := 1− 0.9 · 1 > 0,
hence Theorem B.2 holds and F satisfies the PΥ condition. On the other hand, once can see that ∇xF (x) =
I6 +0.9
[
0 0
15 0
]
and ∇xF (x)+∇xF (x)
>
2 = I6 +
0.9
2
[
0 1>5
15 0
]
has a negative eigenvalue. Hence F is not monotone.
This is consistent with the fact that α2 = 1− 0.9 ·
√
5 < 0, hence Assumption 2a is violated. Following the
discussion in Section 4.2.1, we note that Assumption 2b does not guarantee strong monotonicity because it
provides a bound on ‖G‖∞ but not on ‖G‖1. In this example for instance ‖G‖1 = N − 1 ‖G‖∞ = 1.
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B.3. Conditions in terms of |λmin(G)|
Finally, we consider Assumption 2c which is formulated in terms of |λmin(G)| and therefore can be applied
only to symmetric networks, for which |λmin(G)| is well defined.23 We recall that for symmetric networks
Assumption 2c is the least restrictive condition (see Section 4.1.2 and Figure 4). Because of such generality,
Assumption 2c alone is not sufficient to guarantee any of the properties in Definition 2, as illustrated in
the next example. In this subsection, we derive additional conditions to complement Assumption 2c and
guarantee that at least one of the properties in Definition 2 is satisfied.
Example B.2 (Assumption 2c: multiple equilibria). Consider the linear quadratic game in Example
1 with Ki = − 1N−1 and ai = 0 for all i ∈ N[1, N ] played over the complete network Gc := 1N1>N −IN . Then
αmin := κ1 − κ2|λmin(Gc)| = 1− 1N−1 > 0,
hence Assumption 2c is met for N > 2. From Proposition 1, a vector x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
it solves the VI(X , F ). This is equivalent to the requirement
x = ΠX [x− F (x)], (B.1)
see (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 1.5.8). In this example X = RN≥0 and F (x) = [IN − 1N−1Gc]x.
For any β ∈ R we get
F (β1N ) = [IN − 1N−1Gc]β1N = β1N − β 1N−1Gc1N = β1N − βN−1N−11N = 0.
Consequently, any vector x = β1N with β ≥ 0 solves the fixed point equation (B.1) and this game has
infinitely many Nash equilibria. None of the properties in Definition 2 can therefore hold (recall that they
all imply uniqueness by Proposition 2). This example does not contradict Theorem B.1, since
α2 := κ1 − κ2‖Gc‖ = 1− 1N−1 (N − 1) = 0
hence Assumption 2a is violated. We finally note that, since Ki < 0 for all i, this is a game of strategic
complements.
The previous example proves that Assumption 2c is not enough to guarantee uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in games of strategic complements. We show in the following that Assumption 2c is instead
sufficient for games of strategic substitutes. The intuition for this discrepancy is that for games with the
simple structure in Example 1, the properties in Definition 2 are related to the minimum eigenvalue of
I + KG (i.e., ∇xF (x)) being positive. For simplicity consider the homogeneous weight case where Ki = κ
for all i so that K = κIN . It is then clear that if κ > 0 (substitutes case), the minimum eigenvalue of I+κG
is related to the λmin(G) hence Assumption 2c suffices, while if κ < 0 (complements case) the minimum
eigenvalue of I + κG is related to λmax(G) hence the stronger Assumption 2a is needed. This argument is
made rigorous and generalized to nonlinear and multidimensional network games in the following theorems.
Theorem B.3 (Strong monotonicity under Assumption 2c). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2c hold.
Moreover, assume that
1. Ki(x) = K˜(x) for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and all x ∈ X ;
2. K˜(x) + K˜(x)>  0 for all x ∈ X .
Then the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) is strongly monotone with constant αmin.
23Even if |λmin(G)| was well defined for an asymmetric network, Theorem B.3 and Theorem B.4 would still not apply.
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In Theorem B.3, we guarantee strong monotonicity under Assumption 2c instead of Assumption 2a by
additionally assuming that 1) the neighbor aggregate zi affects the cost of each agent in the same way (i.e.,
∂Ji
∂xizi = K˜(x) for all i) and 2) the symmetrized version of K˜(x) is positive semidefinite. Such conditions are
unfortunately not sufficient to guarantee the PΥ condition, as illustrated next.
Example B.3 (Assumption 2c: Strongly monotone not PΥ). Consider the linear quadratic game in
Example 1, with N = 10, Ki = 0.5 > 0 for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and G = Gc. Then
αmin := κ1 − κ2|λmin(Gc)| = 1− 0.5 = 0.5 > 0,
hence all the assumptions of Theorem B.3 are satisfied and F is strongly monotone. Nonetheless, the matrix
Υ in (11) is equal to I10− 0.5Gc and has minimum eigenvalue λmin(Υ) = 1− 0.5λmax(Gc) = 1− 0.5 · 9 < 0.
Hence Υ is not a P-matrix (all the real eigenvalues of a P-matrix are positive as shown in (Fiedler and
Ptak, 1962, Theorem 3.3)). Condition PΥ is thus violated. Intuitively this happens because the condition
PΥ is agnostic to the sign of the K
is (since κi,j = |Ki|Gij) and is therefore overly conservative for cases
when the Ki are positive (substitute). Note that (for scalar games) this is not the case for the uniform P
matrix condition in Definition D.1. By Lemma D.1 this condition is satisfied if there exists H diagonal and
positive definite such that H(I10 + 0.5Gc) + (I10 + 0.5Gc)H  0. This is clearly the case for H = I10 since
I10 + 0.5Gc  0. Note that the uniform P matrix condition accounts for the fact that the Ki are positive
(i.e., depends on I10 + 0.5Gc instead of I10 − 0.5Gc).
Both conditions in Theorem B.3 are needed to guarantee strong monotonicity. In fact, Example B.2
shows that if condition 1) holds but condition 2) does not, then F might not be strongly monotone. The
next example shows that the same is true if condition 2) holds but condition 1) does not, that is, if we
consider a game of strategic substitutes with heterogeneous weights.
Example B.4 (Assumption 2c: Uniform P-function not strongly monotone, not PΥ). Consider the
linear quadratic game in Example 1, with N = 10, Ki = 0.1 > 0 for all i ∈ Z[1, 9], K10 = 0.9 > 0 and
G = Gc. Then
αmin := κ1 − κ2|λmin(Gc)| = 1− 0.9 = 0.1 > 0,
hence Assumption 2c is satisfied, Ki > 0 for all i but K10 6= Ki for i ∈ N[1, 9]. One can verify that the
following quantity
λmin
(∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)>
2
)
= λmin
(
I +
KGc +GcK
2
)
(B.2)
is negative, hence F is not strongly monotone (it is not even monotone). The reason why with heteroge-
neous weights, strong monotonicity may fail is that in this case the matrix K is diagonal but not scalar.
Consequently, even though Ki > 0 for all i it might happen that
λmin
(
I +
KGc +GcK
2
)
< 1 + λmax(K)λmin(Gc) = 1− κ2|λmin(Gc)| =: αmin. (B.3)
Consequently, one cannot use Assumption 2c to lower bound the left hand side of (B.3) by a positive quantity
(i.e., αmin), which is what would be needed to prove that F is strongly monotone. The PΥ condition is not
satisfied either because in this example Υ = I − KGc and λmin(Υ) < 0, hence Υ is not a P-matrix. By
choosing H = K−1 it is instead easy to show that H(I + KGc) + (I + GcK)H = 2K−1 + 2Gc  0. It
follows from Lemma D.1 and Proposition 3c) that the uniform P-matrix condition holds and F is a uniform
P-function. Again note that the difference between the PΥ and the uniform P-matrix condition reduces in
this simple case to the difference between I −KGc and I +KGc.
In the previous example, the operator is not strongly monotone nor satisfies the PΥ condition. Nonethe-
less, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium can still be guaranteed since F is a uniform P-function. We next
prove that for scalar games (i.e., when n = 1) this is true in general, as long as the Ki(x) are positive.
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Theorem B.4 (Uniform P-matrix condition for scalar games of strategic substitutes). Suppose that
Assumptions 1 and 2c hold and that n = 1. Then
1. if there exists ν > 0 such that Ki(x) ≥ ν for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and all x ∈ X then ∇xF (x) satisfies the
uniform P-matrix condition and the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) is a uniform P-function;
2. if Ki(x) > 0 for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and all x ∈ X then ∇xF (x) is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X and F (x) is a
P-function.
C. Table 2: Proofs of technical statements
Proof of Theorem B.1: Strong monotonicity and PΥ condition under Assumption 2a
1. To prove strong monotonicity note that D(x) in (13) is a symmetric block diagonal matrix and, by
definition (14), λmin(D(x)) ≥ κ1. It follows from Lemma A.3 in Appendix A that D(x)  κ1I for all
x ∈ X . By (12) it then holds
∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)>
2
 κ1I + K(x)W +W
>K(x)>
2
. (C.1)
Note that
λmin
(
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
≥ −ρ
(
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
= −
∥∥∥K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
∥∥∥
2
≥ −‖K(x)W‖2 + ‖W
>K(x)>‖2
2
= −‖K(x)W‖2 ≥ −‖K(x)‖2‖G‖2,
where we used the fact that for symmetric matrices all eigenvalues are real, the spectral radius equals
the 2-norm (see Lemma A.3), the triangular inequality, the fact that for any matrix A it holds ‖A‖2 =
‖A>‖2 and ‖W‖2 = ‖G⊗ In‖2 = ‖G‖2 (see Lemma A.2). Moreover, note that
‖K(x)‖2 ≤ max
x
‖K(x)‖2 = max
x
max
i
‖Ki(x)‖2 = max
i
max
x
‖Ki(x)‖2 = κ2 (C.2)
since the norm of a block diagonal matrix equals the largest norm of its blocks. Using the last result
we can immediately see that
λmin
(
κ1I +
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
= κ1 + λmin
(
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
≥ κ1 − κ2‖G‖2 = α2.
Hence
∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)>
2
 λmin
(
κ1I +
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
INn  α2INn. (C.3)
Since by Assumption 2a α2 > 0, equation (C.3) implies that F (x) is strongly monotone with constant
α2.
2. For network games the matrix Υ in Definition 5 can be rewritten equivalently with the notation in
(14) as
Υ :=

κ11 −κ12G12 . . . −κ12G1N
−κ22G21
. . . 0 −κ22G2N
... 0
. . .
...
−κN2 GN1 . . . −κN2 GN(N−1) κN1
 ∈ RN×N .
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Let us define M := κ1IN − κ2G ∈ RN×N and note that under Assumption 2a
λmin
(
M +M>
2
)
= λmin
(
κ1IN − κ2G+G
>
2
)
= κ1 − κ2λmax
(
G+G>
2
)
= κ1 − κ2
∥∥∥G+G>
2
∥∥∥
2
≥ κ1 − κ2‖G‖2 = α2 > 0.
Hence M+M
>
2  0 and for any w 6= 0 it holds w>M+M
>
2 w = w
>Mw =
∑N
h=1 wh[Mw]h > 0.
Consequently, there exists h ∈ N[1, N ] such that wh[Mw]h > 0 and M is a P-matrix. Since both Υ
and M are Z-matrices (i.e., all the elements outside the diagonal are non-positive) and Υ is greater or
equal than M element-wise, the fact that M is a P-matrix implies that Υ is a P-matrix (Fiedler and
Ptak, 1962, Theorem 4.2). Therefore the PΥ condition holds.
Proof of Theorem B.2: PΥ condition under Assumption 2b
Consider the matrix M := κ1IN − κ2G ∈ RN×N as defined in the proof of Theorem B.1 part 2. Note
that for each i it holds
∑
j 6=i |Mij | ≤ κ2‖G‖∞. By Gershgorin theorem all the eigenvalues of M are therefore
contained in a circle of radius κ2‖G‖∞ centered in (κ1, 0). Since κ1 − κ2‖G‖∞ > 0 all the eigenvalues of M
have positive real part. The same argument can be applied to any principal sub-matrix of M to conclude
that all its eigenvalues have positive real part. This is a sufficient condition for M to be a P-matrix. The
conclusion follows as in Theorem B.1 part 2.
Proof of Theorem B.3: Strong monotonicity under Assumption 2c
The proof of this statement is similar to the proof of Theorem B.1 part 1. The only difference is the
bound on λmin
(
K(x)W+W>K(x)>
2
)
. Note that under Assumption 2c the matrix G is symmetric. It follows
from Lemma 1 that λmin(G) < 0. Moreover, since K
i(x) = K˜(x) for all x we can write K(x) = (IN ⊗K˜(x)).
Consequently, K(x)W = (IN ⊗ K˜(x))(G⊗ In) = (G⊗ K˜(x)). By the properties of the Kronecker product,
λmin
(
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
= λmin
(
(G⊗ K˜(x)) + (G⊗ K˜(x))>
2
)
= λmin
(
(G⊗ K˜(x)) + (G> ⊗ K˜(x)>)
2
)
= λmin
(
(G⊗ K˜(x)) + (G⊗ K˜(x)>)
2
)
= λmin
(
G⊗ K˜(x) + K˜(x)
>
2
)
= λmin(G)λmax
(
K˜(x) + K˜(x)>
2
)
= −|λmin(G)|
∥∥∥K˜(x) + K˜(x)>
2
∥∥∥
2
≥−|λmin(G)| ‖K˜(x)‖2+‖K˜(x)
>‖2
2
=−|λmin(G)|‖K˜(x)‖2 =−|λmin(G)|‖K(x)‖2,
where we used the fact that the eigenvalues of the Kronecker product are the product of the eigenvalues,
all the eigenvalues of K˜(x) + K˜(x)> are non-negative, λmax(
K˜(x)+K˜(x)>
2 ) = ‖ K˜(x)+K˜(x)
>
2 ‖2 and ‖K˜(x)‖2 =
‖K(x)‖2, since K(x) = IN ⊗ K˜(x) (see Lemmas A.2 and A.3). Combining this new bound with (C.2) we
get
λmin
(
κ1I +
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
= κ1 + λmin
(
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
≥ κ1 − κ2|λmin(G)| = αmin.
Hence from (C.1) we get
∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)>
2
 λmin
(
κ1I +
K(x)W +W>K(x)>
2
)
INn  αminINn. (C.4)
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Since by Assumption 2c αmin > 0, equation (C.4) implies that F (x) is strongly monotone with constant
αmin.
Proof of Theorem B.4: Uniform P-matrix condition for scalar games of strategic substitutes
To prove the first statement we prove that ∇xF (x) ∈ RN×N satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition.
The fact that F is a uniform P-function then follows from Proposition 3c). Let us consider any set of N
vectors {x[h] ∈ X}Nh=1, and the corresponding matrix
Ax :=
 [∇xF (x[1])](1,:)...
[∇xF (x[N])](N,:)
 ∈ RN×N .
Because of formula (12) and since n = 1 we get
Ax :=
D1(x[1]) . . .
DN (x[N])
+
K1(x[1]) . . .
KN (x[N])
G.
Note that since n = 1 for all {x[h] ∈ X}Nh=1 and h ∈ N[1, N ], Dh(x[h]) and Kh(x[h]) are positive numbers.
In particular,
Hx :=
K1(x[1]) . . .
KN (x[N])
−1
is well defined, diagonal and positive definite. Overall, we get
HxAx =

D1(x[1])
K1(x[1])
. . .
DN (x[N])
KN (x[N])
+G.
Note that HxAx is symmetric, therefore we can use Lemma A.3 and conclude that
HxAx 
(
min
h
Dh(x[h])
Kh(x[h])
+ λmin(G)
)
IN 
(
minhD
h(x[h])
maxhKh(x[h])
+ λmin(G)
)
IN 
(
κ1
κ2
+ λmin(G)
)
IN =: ηIN .
It follows that if for any w ∈ RN we set Hx,w = Hx, it holds w>Hx,wAxw = w>HxAxw ≥ η‖w‖22. Moreover,
by Assumption 2c we have that η = αminκ2 > 0 (recall λmin(G) < 0 as by Lemma 1). Finally note that for
any fixed set of vectors {x[h] ∈ X}Nh=1,
max
w
λmax(Hx,w) = λmax(Hx) = max
h
1
Kh(x[h])
=
1
minhKh(x[h])
≤ 1
ν
.
Hence max{x[h]∈X}Nh=1 maxw λmax(Hx,w) ≤
1
ν <∞.
To prove the second statement we note that following similar arguments it is possible to prove that
∇xF (x) is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X . Since n = 1, X is a rectangle and the conclusion that F (x) is a
P-function follows by (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.9 (a)).
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D. A novel sufficient condition for uniform P-functions
Definition D.1 (Uniform P-matrix condition). Given a matrix valued function x 7→ A(x) ∈ Rd×d, we
say that A(x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition over X if there exists η > 0 such that for all sets
of d vectors {x[h] ∈ X}dh=1 and for any w ∈ Rd there exists a diagonal matrix Hx,w  0 such that it holds
w>Hx,wAxw ≥ η‖w‖22, where
Ax :=
 [A(x[1])](1,:)...
[A(x[d])](d,:)

and max{x[h]∈X}dh=1 maxw∈Rd λmax(Hx,w) <∞.
Remark D.1. The uniform P-matrix condition in Definition D.1 might seem complicated at first sight.
This is a slightly stronger condition than requiring that: “A(x) is a P-matrix for all x” (we refer to this
condition as 6’). If A(x) = ∇xF (x) satisfies 6’ instead of 6, one can guarantee that F is a P-function,
as by Definition A.1 in Appendix A, but not necessarily that F is a uniform P-function. Consequently,
condition 6’ is not sufficient to guarantee existence of a VI solution (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition
3.5.10). To obtain Definition D.1 from 6’, we strengthen the requirement that A(x) is a P-matrix for all x
(or equivalently that for any x,w 6= 0 there exists Hx,w such that w>Hx,wA(x)w > 0) in two ways. First, we
require a uniform curvature bound (i.e., we require w>Hx,wA(x)w ≥ η‖w‖22 instead of w>Hx,wA(x)w > 0).
Second, we require that this condition holds not only for all possible A(x) matrices but also for all matrices
Ax obtained by selecting each row from a different matrix in the set {A(x[h])}dh=1 obtained by evaluating A(x)
at d different points {x[h]}dh=1. The technical reason for this is that in the proof of Proposition 3c) we need to
apply the mean value theorem to each row separately.24 We also note that for the case n = 1, Definition D.1
is different from Definition 5 (see Example B.4). Consequently, parts b) and c) of Proposition 3 provide
different sufficient conditions even for the case n = 1.
For gradients of affine operators, an equivalent but simpler condition for Definition D.1 is given next.
Lemma D.1. Consider an operator F (x) = Ax + a where A ∈ Rd×d, a ∈ Rd. Then ∇xF (x) satisfies the
uniform P-matrix condition if and only if there exists η > 0 such that for any w ∈ Rd there exists a diagonal
matrix Hw  0 such that w>HwAw ≥ η‖w‖2 and maxw λmax(Hw) <∞. More simply, ∇xF (x) satisfies the
uniform P-matrix condition if there exists a diagonal matrix H  0 such that HA+A>H  0.
Proof. For affine operators ∇xF (x) = A is a matrix independent of x. Consequently, Ax = A for all
{x[h]}dh=1. Hence the uniform P-matrix condition is satisfied if there exists η > 0 such that for any w ∈ Rd
there exists a diagonal matrix Hw  0 such that w>HwAw ≥ η‖w‖2. Here max{x[h]}dh=1 maxw λmax(Hw,x) =
maxw λmax(Hw). Note that if there exists a diagonal matrix H  0 such that HA + A>H  0, then the
previous statement holds with Hw = H for all w ∈ Rd, η := 12λmin(HA+A>H) > 0 and λmax(H) <∞.
For the affine case, condition 6’ in Remark D.1 requires A to be a P-matrix. Equivalently, F (x) = Ax+a
is a P-function if for any w 6= 0 there exists a diagonal matrix Hw  0 such that w>HwAw > 0. The only
difference in Lemma D.1 is that it requires a uniformity condition on the eigenvalues of the Hw.
We next report the proof of Proposition 3c) and some comparison with previous literature results. We
start with the auxiliary Lemma D.2. Theorem D.1 proves Proposition 3c).
Lemma D.2. Consider a matrix Ax ∈ Rd×d and suppose that there exists η > 0 such that for all w ∈ Rd
there exists a diagonal matrix Hx,w  0 such that it holds w>Hx,wAxw ≥ η‖w‖22. Then for all w ∈ Rd there
exists h ∈ N[1, d] such that
wh[Axw]h ≥ η
dMx
‖w‖22,
where Mx := maxw λmax(Hx,w).
24Whether a statement as in Proposition 3c) could be proven by only adding the first condition to 6’ is an open problem.
We did not investigate this point further because for the network games studied in this paper, Definition D.1 is satisfied.
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Proof. By contradiction suppose that it is not true. That is, there exists w ∈ Rd such that for all h ∈ N[1, d]
wh[Axw]h <
η
dMx
‖w‖22. (D.1)
Consider now the product w>Hx,wAxw, recall that Hx,w is diagonal positive definite, from (D.1) we get
w>Hx,wAxw =
d∑
h=1
[Hx,w]hwh[Axw]h <
d∑
h=1
[Hx,w]h
η
dMx
‖w‖22 ≤
d∑
h=1
η
d
‖w‖22 = η‖w‖22,
where we used [Hx,w]h ≤ λmax(Hx,w) ≤Mx for all h ∈ N[1, d]. This is absurd.
Theorem D.1. Consider a continuously differentiable operator F (x) defined in X ⊆ Rd. If ∇xF (x) satisfies
the uniform P-matrix condition then F (x) is a uniform P-function.
Proof. Let [F (x)]h = F
h(x). Take any two vectors x, y ∈ X and for any h ∈ N[1, d] consider the function
Φh(t) : [0, 1] 7→ R defined as
Φh(t) = F
h(y + t(x− y))[x− y]h.
Note that Φh(1) = F
h(x)[x− y]h and Φh(0) = Fh(y)[x− y]h, hence
Φh(1)− Φh(0) = (Fh(x)− Fh(y))[x− y]h = [F (x)− F (y)]h[x− y]h. (D.2)
By the mean value theorem, there exists θh ∈ [0, 1] such that
Φh(1)− Φh(0) = dΦh(θh)
dt
(1− 0) = dΦh(θh)
dt
. (D.3)
However, if we let x[h] := y + θh(x− y) ∈ X we get
dΦh(θh)
dt
= [x− y]h
d∑
k=1
∂Fh(x[h])
∂xk
[x− y]k = [x− y]h
d∑
k=1
[∇xF (x[h])]h,k[x− y]k. (D.4)
Combining (D.2), (D.3) and (D.4) we get
[F (x)− F (y)]h[x− y]h = [x− y]h
d∑
k=1
[∇xF (x[h])]h,k[x− y]k.
Let us define the matrix
Ax :=
 [∇xF (x[1])](1,:)...
[∇xF (x[d])](d,:)

then
[F (x)− F (y)]h[x− y]h = [x− y]h[Ax(x− y)]h.
Since ∇xF (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition, we have that for any w ∈ Rd there exists a
diagonal matrix Hx,w  0 such that it holds w>Hx,wAxw ≥ η‖w‖22. From Lemma D.2, for any w ∈ Rd
there exists h ∈ N[1, d] such that
wh[Axw]h ≥ η
dmaxw λmax(Hx,w)
‖w‖22 ≥
η
dM
‖w‖22,
where M := maxw λmax(Hx,w) <∞. By selecting w = x− y we get that there exists h ∈ N[1, d] such that
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[F (x)− F (y)]h[x− y]h = [x− y]h[Ax(x− y)]h ≥ η
dM
‖x− y‖22.
Since this holds for all x, y we get that F is a uniform P-function with constant ηdM > 0.
Note that in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.9(a)) it is shown that if ∇xF (x) is a P-matrix for
all x ∈ X then F is a P-function (according to Definition A.1). Lemma D.1 above shows that by substituting
the condition “∇xF (x) is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X” with “∇xF (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition”
one can get that F is a uniform P-function which is stronger than F being a P-function (see Figure A.8).
In this work, we need the uniformity property to prove existence of the VI solution without imposing that
the set X is bounded.
E. Best response dynamics: Additional statements and proofs
Lemma E.1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let di(x) := Bi(zi(x))− xi then
F i(x)>di(x) ≤ −κ1‖di(x)‖22. (E.1)
Proof. For simplicity set βi := Bi(zi(x)) := arg minyi∈X i J i(yi, zi(x)). Then it holds ∇xiJ i(βi, zi)>(yi −
βi) = F i(βi, x−i)>(yi − βi) ≥ 0,∀yi ∈ X i. Select yi = xi then
0 ≤F i(βi, x−i)>(xi − βi) = [F i(βi, x−i)− F i(xi, x−i)]>(xi − βi) + F i(x)>(xi − βi)
= (βi − xi)>Di(x˜i, x−i)(xi − βi)− F i(x)>di(x),
where x˜i = (1− t)xi + tβi for some t ∈ [0, 1] by the mean value theorem. Hence
F i(x)>di(x) ≤ −di(x)>Di(x˜i, x−i)di(x) ≤ −κ1‖di(x)‖22.
Lemma E.2 (Convergence in potential games). Consider a potential game satisfying Assumption 1
and with strongly convex potential U(x). Then the continuous BR dynamics (Algorithm 1) and the discrete
sequential BR dynamics (Algorithm 2 for Ti = N(N−1)+i) globally converge to the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This is a well known result, see e.g. Monderer and Shapley (1996) and (Sandholm, 2010, Theorem
7.1.3). The proof is reported for completeness. For continuous BR dynamics consider L(x) := U(x)−U(x?)
as Lyapunov function. Note that L(x) ≥ 0 for all x and L(x) = 0 if and only if x = x?, since the Nash
equilibrium is the unique minimizer of U(x). Moreover, L˙(x(t)) = ∇xU(x(t))>x˙(t) = F (x(t))>d(x(t)) ≤
−κ1‖d(x(t))‖22 ≤ 0 by Lemma E.1 and L˙(x) = 0 if and only if d(x) = 0. Since d(x) = 0 if and only if x = x?
it follows by Lyapunov theorem that x(t)→ x?.
For discrete sequential BR dynamics note that since for any agent i we have
Bi(zi(x)) := arg min
yi∈X i
J i(yi, zi(x)) = arg min
yi∈X i
U(yi, x−i)
then, if i is the agent updating at time k, it holds U(xk+1) = U(x
i
k+1, x
−i
k ) = minyi∈X i U(y
i, x−ik ) ≤
U(xik, x
−i
k ) = U(xk). Following the same arguments of (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1997, Proposition 3.9) it is
possible to show that every limit point of {xk}∞k=1 minimizes U(x). Since U(x) is strongly convex there is a
unique minimizer which is the Nash equilibrium. Hence all limit points of {xk}∞k=1 coincide and equal the
Nash equilibrium. We can conclude that xk → x?.
Lemma E.3. If the cost function is as in (24) then
Bi(zi(x)) = ΠQ
i
X i [x
i−(Qi)−1F i(x)] := arg min
yi∈X i
‖yi−xi+Q−1i F i(x)‖2Qi = arg min
yi∈X i
1
2
‖yi−xi‖2Qi+F i(x)>(yi−xi)
37
Proof. If the cost function is as in (24) then F i(x) = Qixi + f i(zi) and
Bi(zi(x)) = arg min
yi∈X i
1
2
‖yi‖2Qi + f i(zi)>yi = arg min
yi∈X i
‖yi‖2Qi + 2[F i(x)−Qixi]>yi
= arg min
yi∈X i
‖yi‖2Qi + 2[(Qi)−1F i(x)− xi]>Qiyi
= arg min
yi∈X i
‖yi‖2Qi + 2[(Qi)−1F i(x)− xi]>Qiyi + ‖(Qi)−1F i(x)− xi‖2Qi
= arg min
yi∈X i
‖yi − xi + (Qi)−1F i(x)‖2Qi .
Proof of Lemma 2
This fact coincides with (Fukushima, 1992, Proposition 4.1) upon noticing thatB(x) = arg miny∈X F (x)>(y−
x) + 12‖x − y‖2Q as shown in Lemma E.3. The following proof is reported for completeness. Let h(x, y) :=
F (x)>(y − x) + 12‖x− y‖2Q. It follows by Lemma E.3 that B(x) = arg miny∈X h(x, y) and thus
U˜(x) = −h(x,B(x)) = −min
y∈X
h(x, y).
Consequently,
∇xU˜(x) = −∇xh(x,B(x)) = F (x)− [∇xF (x)−Q]d(x)
and
∇xU˜(x)>d(x) = F (x)>d(x)− d(x)>∇xF (x)>d(x) + d(x)>Qd(x) (E.2)
≤ −d(x)>Qd(x)− d(x)>∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)
>
2
d(x) + d(x)>Qd(x) ≤ −α‖d(x)‖22, (E.3)
where the first inequality follows from the proof of Lemma E.1 and the second from the fact that F is
strongly monotone.
Proof of Theorem 1
Note that if the cost functions are as in (24) then U˜(x) = −F (x)>d(x)− 12‖d(x)‖2Q ≥ 12‖d(x)‖2Q by the
proof of Lemma E.1 (in fact F (x)>d(x) ≤ −‖d(x)‖2Q). Hence U˜(x) ≥ 0 and U˜(x) = 0 if and only if d(x) = 0.
Recall that d(x) = 0 if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium. This theorem is then an immediate consequence
of Lemma 2 using U˜(x) as Lyapunov function, since
˙˜U(x(t)) = ∇xU˜(x(t))>d(x(t)) ≤ −α‖d(x(t))‖22.
Proof of Theorem 2
For the discrete dynamics, convergence is a consequence of Lemma 3 and (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1997,
Proposition 2.1), as shown in (Scutari et al., 2014, Theorem 10). For the continuous dynamics note that
since B(x) is a block contraction, then (1− τ)x+ τB(x) is a block contraction for any τ ∈ (0, 1]. In fact let
‖v‖c,block := maxi ‖v
i‖2
ci
then
‖(1− τ)x+ τB(x)‖c,block ≤ (1− τ)‖x‖c,block + τ‖B(x)‖c,block ≤ [(1− τ) + τδc]‖x‖c,block
and (1− τ) + τδc < 1 for any τ ∈ (0, 1] since δc < 1. Consequently the Euler discretization of the continuous
BR dynamics which is given by
xik+1 = (1− τ)xik + τBi(zik) (E.4)
converges for any τ ∈ (0, 1]. Intuitively, in the limit for τ → 0 this argument yields convergence of the
continuous BR dynamics. A more rigorous proof is provided next. Let x¯ be the unique Nash equilibrium
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(recall that the PΥ condition implies uniqueness). Recall that by the proof of (Scutari et al., 2014, Proposition
42) it holds
‖Bi(zi)−Bi(z¯i)‖2 ≤ 1
κi,i
∑
j 6=i
κi,j‖xj − x¯j‖2.
Let us define v(t) ∈ RN≥0 component-wise such that
vi(t) =
1
2
‖xi(t)− x¯i‖22 ≥ 0.
Note that each component vi(t) is differentiable and it holds
v˙i = (x
i − x¯i)>x˙i = (xi − x¯i)>(Bi(zi)− xi) = (xi − x¯i)>(Bi(zi)−Bi(z¯i) + x¯i − xi)
= (xi − x¯i)>(Bi(zi)−Bi(z¯i))− ‖xi − x¯i‖22 ≤ ‖xi − x¯i‖2‖Bi(zi)−Bi(z¯i)‖2 − ‖xi − x¯i‖22
≤ 1
κi,i
‖xi − x¯i‖2
∑
j 6=i
κi,j‖xj − x¯j‖2 − κi,i‖xi − x¯i‖2
 = − 2
κi,i
√
vi
−∑
j 6=i
κi,j
√
vj + κi,i
√
vi

= − 2
κi,i
√
vi
[
Υ
√
v
]
i
,
where [
√
v]i :=
√
vi. Therefore v(t) satisfies the differential inequality
v˙i ≤ − 2
κi,i
√
vi
[
Υ
√
v
]
i
, vi(0) =
1
2
‖xi(0)− x¯i‖22 ≥ 0.
The matrix Υ> is a P-matrix (by assumption) and a Z-matrix (by construction). It follows by (Plemmons,
1977, Theorem 1) that there exists a positive diagonal matrix ∆ such that
Υ>∆ + ∆Υ  δI
for some δ > 0. Consider the Lyapunov function L(v) =
∑
i
κi,i
2 ∆iivi ≥ 0 and note that L(v) = 0 if and
only if v = 0, since v ≥ 0 by definition. Moreover
L˙(v(t)) =
∑
i
κi,i
2
∆iiv˙i(t) ≤ −
∑
i
∆ii
√
vi(t)
[
Υ
√
v(t)
]
i
= −
√
v(t)
>
∆Υ
√
v(t)
= −
√
v(t)
>∆Υ + Υ>∆
2
√
v(t) ≤ −δ
2
‖
√
v(t)‖22 = −
δ
2
‖v(t)‖1.
Again, since v ≥ 0, it holds ‖v‖1 = 0 if and only if v = 0. This guarantees that L˙(v) < 0 for all v 6= 0. Note
that instead v(t) = 0 implies xi(t) = x¯i hence when v(t) = 0
L˙(0) =
∑
i
κi,i
2
∆iiv˙i(t) =
∑
i
κi,i
2
∆ii(x
i(t)− x¯i)>x˙i(t) = 0.
Hence it follows by the Lyapunov theorem that v(t)→ 0. Hence x(t)→ x¯.
Proof of Theorem 3
Consider first the unconstrained case X i = R. By Lemma E.3 if the cost functions are as in (24) and
Q = I the continuous BR dynamics are equivalent to x˙(t) = ΠX [x−F (x)]−x = x−F (x)−x = −F (x). The
error dynamics is thus e˙(t) = −F (e(t) + x?) where e(t) = x(t) − x?. If we linearize around e? = 0 we get
e˙(t) = −∇xF (x?)e(t). Since ∇xF (x?) is a P-matrix, all its real eigenvalues are positive by Fiedler and Ptak
(1962). We next show that all the eigenvalues of ∇xF (x?) are real. Note that ∇xF (x?) = I+K(x)G. Thus it
suffices to show that all eigenvalues of K(x)G are real. Note that K(x) is a diagonal positive definite matrix
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and recall that G = G>. The matrix K(x)G is similar to K(x)
1
2GK(x)
1
2 which is symmetric, hence all its
eigenvalues are real. Overall, all the eigenvalues of −∇xF (x?) are real and negative, which is a sufficient
condition for local asymptotic stability of the error dynamics.
If constraints are present (i.e. X i = [ai, bi] for some ai, bi ∈ R) but the equilibrium is non-degenerate
(i.e. strict complementarity is met) then for the agents whose equilibrium strategies are at the boundary it
must be either x?,i − F i(x?) < ai or x?,i − F i(x?) > bi. In fact, consider the case x?,i = ai. From the fact
that this is an equilibrium we get x?,i = Bi(zi(x?)) = Π[ai,bi][x
?,i−F i(x?)] = ai and thus x?,i−F i(x?) ≤ ai.
The fact that the equilibrium is non degenerate then leads to x?,i−F i(x?) < ai. For any x sufficiently close
to x?, by continuity of F it holds xi − F i(x) < ai and thus Bi(zi(x)) = Π[ai,bi][xi − F i(x)] = ai. Similar
statements apply to the case x?,i = bi. Overall, for local perturbations the dynamics is either x˙i(t) = ai−xi
or x˙i(t) = bi − xi hence the strategies of the agents whose equilibrium strategy is at the boundary converge
back to equilibrium independently of x−i. For the rest of the agents the equilibrium is interior hence
locally ΠX i [xi − F i(x)] = xi − F i(x). The dynamics of these agents (which we collectively index by I) are
x˙I(t) = −FI(xI , x−I) and the linearized error dynamics are e˙I(t) = −[∇xF (x?)]I,IeI(t). Similar arguments
can be applied to prove that all eigenvalues of −[∇xF (x?)]I,I are negative since [∇xF (x?)]I,I is a principal
submatrix of a P-matrix.
E.1. Additional examples
Example E.1 (Discrete BR dynamics under strong monotonicity). A) Consider the game in Ex-
ample 1 with N = 4, Ki = 0.5, G = Gc and a
i = 1. We have already shown in Example B.3 that the game
Jacobian is strongly monotone and Assumption 2c is met. It is also easy to see that this game is potential
since
KiGij = 0.5 = K
jGji.
Figure E.9A) shows that the simultaneous discrete BR dynamics do not converge. The fact that the game
is potential instead guarantees that both the continuous and discrete sequential BR dynamics converge. B)
We next show that if we remove the potential structure this result is not guaranteed anymore. To this end,
consider the exact same example but assume K1 = −1.5 instead of K1 = 0.5. Note that the game is not
potential anymore because
K1G1j = −1.5 6= 0.5 = KjGj1.
Nonetheless, by numerical computation of the eigenvalues of ∇xF (x) +∇xF (x)> one can verify that F (x)
is strongly monotone. Figure E.9B) illustrates that both simultaneous and sequential discrete BR dynamics
oscillate.
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Figure E.9: Best response dynamics for the network games in Example E.1.
Example E.2 (Strong monotonicity does not imply block-contraction). Consider the
game in Example E.1A) with X i = R for simplicity. We have already shown therein that the game Jacobian
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is strongly monotone, however the best response mapping is not a block contraction. To see this take any two
vectors x, y ∈ RN such that x−y = 1N . Then we get ‖B(x)−B(y)‖∞ = ‖KGc(x−y)‖∞ = 0.5‖Gc1N‖∞ =
0.5(N − 1)‖1N‖∞ = 0.5(N − 1)‖x− y‖∞ > ‖x− y‖∞.
F. Comparative statics: Additional statements and proofs
Proof of Theorem 4: Lipschitz continuity
We prove only the second statement, since the first one is similar. For simplicity let F¯ (·) = F (·, y¯, G¯)
and F (·) = F (·, y,G). Also let x¯ := x?(y¯, G¯) be the unique solution of VI(X , F¯ ) and x := x?(y,G) any
solution of VI(X , F ). Note that for each agent i, x¯i and xi are the best responses to x¯ and x, respectively.
Consequently, by the minimum principle for convex optimization it holds
F¯ i(x¯)>(yi − x¯i) ≥ 0, ∀yi ∈ X i,
F i(x)>(yi − xi) ≥ 0, ∀yi ∈ X i.
By setting yi = xi in the first line and yi = x¯i in the second line, we get
0 ≥ (F¯ i(x¯)− F i(x))>(x¯i − xi) = (F¯ i(x¯)− F¯ i(x))>(x¯i − xi) + (F¯ i(x)− F i(x))>(x¯i − xi). (F.1)
Since F¯ is a uniform block P function there exists at least one agent i such that (F¯ i(x¯)− F¯ i(x))>(x¯i−xi) ≥
η¯‖x¯− x‖22. From (F.1) for such agent we can write
η¯‖x¯− x‖22 ≤ (F¯ i(x¯)− F¯ i(x))>(x¯i − xi) ≤ |(F¯ i(x)− F i(x))>(x¯i − xi)|
≤ ‖F¯ i(x)− F i(x)‖2‖x¯i − xi‖2 ≤ ‖F¯ i(x)− F i(x)‖2‖x¯− x‖2.
Dividing by ‖x¯− x‖2 we get η¯‖x¯− x‖2 ≤ ‖F¯ i(x)− F i(x)‖2.25 Hence
η¯2‖x¯− x‖22 ≤ ‖F¯ i(x)− F i(x)‖22 = ‖∇xiJ i(xi, z¯i(x), y¯i)−∇xiJ i(xi, zi(x), yi)‖22
≤ L2(‖z¯i(x)− zi(x)‖22 + ‖y¯i − yi‖22) ≤ L2(‖z¯(x)− z(x)‖22 + ‖y¯ − y‖22)
≤ L2(‖G¯−G‖22‖x‖22 + ‖y¯ − y‖22) ≤ L2(‖G¯−G‖22∆2 + ‖y¯ − y‖22),
where for any x ∈ X we set z¯i(x) := ∑Nj=1 G¯ijxj and zi(x) := ∑Nj=1Gijxj .
The case of scalar non-negativity constraints
In the case of scalar strategies and non-negativity constraints, Assumption 5 and Proposition 5 can be
simplified. First of all, for any game G(y) let us call active any agent i ∈ N[1, N ] for which x?i(y) > 0 and
inactive any agent for which x?i(y) = 0. Let A be the set of active players at y¯. Since only non-negativity
constraints are present B = −IN , b = 0 and H,h are empty. This simplifies Assumption 5. Specifically,
since A is obtained by selecting only rows from B = −IN Assumption 5b) always holds. If we write the
KKT conditions for these constraints we have
F (x?(y), y)− λ(y) = 0 (F.2a)
λ(y)>x?(y) = 0, x?(y) ≥ 0, λ(y) ≥ 0. (F.2b)
25Note that this is a result about the “global” stability of the solution x¯ of a VI(X , F¯ ) where X has a cartesian structure and
F¯ is a uniform block P-function with respect to the same partition. Stability of VI solutions has been extensively studied, see
e.g. (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Chapter 5). Our proof follows the same lines as the proof of (Nagurney, 2013, Theorem 1.14),
(Dafermos, 1988, Theorem 2.1) where the same result is proven under the more restrictive assumption of strong monotonicity.
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Hence from (F.2a) we get that the dual variable λi(y) associated with the constraint that the strategy of
agent i should be non-negative is λi(y) = ∇xiJ i(x?i(y), zi(x?(y)), yi). The strict complementarity condition
in Assumption 5c) is then equivalent to the requirement that
x?i(y¯) = 0 ⇒ ∇xiJ i(x?i(y¯), zi(x?(y¯)), y¯i) > 0. (F.3)
When Assumption 5 holds, for any small perturbation of y around y¯ the set of active players does not
change. This means that in a neighborhood of y¯ we can equivalently consider a reduced game GA(y) where
we remove all the players that are inactive at y¯. Let GA be the adjacency matrix obtained by deleting
from G all the rows and columns with indices not in A. Any Nash equilibrium of the reduced game GA(y),
complemented with x?i(y) = 0 for all i /∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the full game G(y). Consequently, the
vector of sensitivities can be computed applying formula (30) to the reduced game (for which there are no
active constraints) resulting in
∇yx?A(y¯) = −[(∇xFA(x, y))−1∇yFA(x, y)]{x=x?A(y¯),y=y¯}
∇yx?Ac(y¯) = 0,
where Ac denotes the set of inactive players at y¯. This result allows for example to derive (Allouch, 2015,
Proposition 1).
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